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ABSTRACT

The research problem is to examine the epistemological nature
of the relationship which exists between the human will and the learn
ing process using the development of a fictional character, i.e,,
Stavrogin in Dostoevsky’s The Possessed, as focus for the study.
The purpose of this study is to identify and analyze Dostoevsky’s
theory of will as that theory describes the educational growth and devel
opment of the individual and defines the process by which the individual
comes to know his own nature and that of the world.

The study derives

from the theory of will specific educational principles.
Dostoevsky’s theory of will is defined as a movement of mind in
which progress is made towards a closer realisation of the absolute.
This movement towards union with the absolute gives rise to a heightened
sense of self.

This heightened sense of self gives rise, in turn, to an

awareness of the inter-relationships and dependencies which make up the
structure of the world.
The principles derived from the study of Dostoevsky's theory of
will are considered as epistemological principles which have relevance
to educational theory.
1.

They are identified as follows:

Dostoevsky's epistemology demands as a starting point the

concept of the self as a choosing subjectivity.

Educational theory

should take into consideration the concept of self as it seeks to
develop the individual worth of those involved In education.

2.

The concept of self is tied to a recognition of man's will

as an agent of decision and commitment.

Educational theory must acknowl

edge the existence and function of will if it wishes to promote the
development of self.
3.

The will is that aspect of mind which commits the individ

ual to the relationship with the other-as-subject which is at the heart
of the learning process.

The learning process refers to the interaction

which takes place when two individtials freely enter into relationship in
order to examine those ideas which have a bearing on their existence.
4.

Learning wil3 not take place unless one acknowledges the

existence of the other-as-subject.

Education implies relationship,

i.e., the unique relationship which exists between educator and
student.

CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

Among the concepts which are basic to the field of education,
one of the most important is "learning process."

It is the contention

of this study that in order to gain a deeper insight into the nature
of this particular process it is necessary to examine the way in which
it interacts with the human will.

As Peterson has pointed out, "it is

the will which continually insists upon the mind being actively engaged
in the learning process" (Peterson 1977b, p. 16).

This study, in order

to illuminate the nature of the relationship which exists between will
and learning process, analyzes the moral development of a fictional
character.

The rationale underlying this approach is that in examining

the development of a fictional character the learning process is being
viewed from an entirely unique point of view.

Not only is it a unique

approach, it is an eminently valid one.
. . . literature is . . . pre-eminently concerned with man's
social world, his adaptation to it, and his desire to change
it. Thus the novel . . . can be seen as a faithful attempt
to re-create the social world of man’s relationship with his
family, with politics, with the state; it delineates too his
roles within the family and other institutions (Laurenson and
Swingegood 1972, p. 12).
In one important respect, literature achieves much more than "mere
description and scientific analysis" (Laurenson and Swingegood 1972,
p. 12), i.e., it goes beneath the surface in order to shed light on
the way in which individuals "emotionally" experience society.

Not
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only does literature share the same concerns as the social sciences, it
transcends them.

In studying the development of a character who embodies

the major themes of this study, the reader is being presented with a
study whose vividness is far more persuasive than any discursive argu
mentation.

In utilizing a work of art, the analysis of any human phe

nomenon is clarified and deepened.

Need for the Study
It is the contention of this study that there is a definite need
to illuminate the nature of the relationship *?hich exists between the
"will’’ and "learning process" in that this relationship is the major
determinant of success or failure insofar as the teacher-student inter
action is concerned.

The relationship between the two has not been

fully explored heretofore.
In order to understand any phenomenon, it is necessary to exam
ine it from a variety of points of view.

This study seeks to illuminate

the nature of the relationship which exists between the "will" and
"le.arning process" through the study of a character in a novel by
Dostoevsky, i.e., Stavrogin in Dostoevsky’s The Possessed.

This par

ticular approach is utilized for the following reasons:
1.

Dostoevsky was convinced of the importance of "will" insofar

as human behavior was concerned:
. . . he (Dostoevsky) sees human, existence us expressed pri
marily in will, not reason. Will is not an opposite to reason
but a greater whole which includes it, "a manifestation of the
whole . . . of human life, including reason with all its con
comitant. headscratchings" (Friedman 1970, p. 155).
This particular concept of will concurs with the concepts put forward by
Peterson and Schrag, the two theorists whose ideas concerning the will

form Che theoretical underpinning of the study.

Both Peterson and Schrag,

while acknowledging the importance of reason, are firmly convinced that
it is part of a greater whole.
Unlike Schrag and Peterson, who chose to present their ideas in
the form of systematical philosophical treatises, Dostoevsky chose to
embody his ideas and themes in fictional characters.

In examining the

development of Stavrogin, therefore, the reader is being presented with
a concrete example of what Schrag and Peterson are discussing in an
abstract way.
2.

In so doing, their formulations are further illuminated.
Stavrogin was chosen because of his ability to illuminate

the theoretical discussions of Schrag and Peterson.

Both theorists, in

their studies of the will, emphasise the fact that the will, in order
to function effectively, is dependent upon the interaction which occurs
between the cognitive and affective aspects of the mind.

The relation

ship between the cognitive and the affective was one of the central con
cerns of nineteenth century literature.

As Clive points out, this liter

ature was especially concerned with the consequences of a rift between
the cognitive and the affective.

Nowhere is this concern more clearly

evidenced than in Dostoevsky’s The Possessed.
Nineteenth century literature is filled with expressions
of this daemonic rift between insensitive knowing and wayward
feeling. . . . Stavrogin's "Confession" in Dostoevsky's Pos
sessed is perhaps the "last" word on the subject.
Stavrogin,
knowing that in the closet in back of him a child is hanging
itself, does not interfere, for he is reading his paper
(Clive 1960, p. 29).
In studying Stavrogin's development, light is shed on a relationship
(between cognitive and affective) which both Schrag and Peterson con
sider to be of tne utmost importance.

A

3.

Dostoevsky also emphasizes the importance o£ the teacher-

student relationship to human development.

He does this through a

description of the relationship which existed between the young
Stavrogin and Stephan, his tutor.

At the heart of the learning

process lies the relationship which exists between teacher and pupil.
As Herman Nohl points out, "the foundation of education is the intense
relationship of a mature person to a becoming man" (Quoted in Mundackal
1977, p. 213).

It is through such a relationship of openness and mutu

ality between man and man that an individual achieves self-awareness
and is confirmed in his uniqueness.

Friedman, in summarizing

Dostoevsky's beliefs concerning man, makes the same point:
. . . Man can find meaning and spiritual joy even in the
midst of suffering if he is moving towards a whole and
genuine way of life, a reciprocally confirming relation
ship with other men and with nature (Friedman 1970, p. 275).
Such a "reciprocally confirming relationship" entails a commitment on
the part of the individual to those individuals with whom he is involved.
Commitment, as Schrag points out, is an act of will.
. . . Willing is a project that reaches towards figures
(that which is willed) outlined against a background.
. . . The self in its volitional activity assumes a
decision making stance and inserts itself into a plan
of action. It becomes commited to . . . something . . .
(Schrag 1969, p. 101).
Will and learning process are thus inextricably intertwined.
Dostoevsky provides the reader with a concrete example of this
interaction.

Not only does he focus in on the relationship which exists

between Stavrogin (student) and Stephan (teacher), he, in addition, dis
cusses the relationship between Stavrogin and his three disciples:
Kirilov, Shatov, and Pyotr Verlchovensky.

The reader is presented with

a portrait of Stavrogin as both pupil and teacher.

In presenting

the reader with this dual perspective, Dostoevsky shows how an initial
student-teacher relationship influences the way in which an individual
behaves in similar situations at a later stage in his existence, the
only difference being that the student has now become the teacher.
4.

Stavrogin is an especially suitable character for analysis

because in examining his development light will be shed on other char
acters in Dostoevsky's x^ork as well as on modern man in general.
Nicholas Stavrogin . . . inherits and intensifies the
alienation and inner division of the Underground Han and
Raskolnikov. Stavrogin, more than any other of Dostoevsky's
characters, represents the divided man as exile, and for
this reason he embodies the problematic of modern man as
perhaps no other of Dostoevsky's characters, . . . (Fried
man 1970, p. 172).
5.

Farber, in his discussion of will, points out that psychol

ogists and philosophers, among others, on those rare occasions when they
have turned their attention to the concept of will, have dealt with it
in such a way as to make it "difficult for the reader to know that the
will had any relevance to human considerations" (Farber 1966, p. 29).
For this reason, Farber believes that the individual should turn to
literature in order to acquire insight into the workings of will:
. . . literature was spared the attrition born of academicism.
Literature— ’in whose view the human condition is inevitably a
drama of conflict— has always been interested in man as a
creature with some capacity, even if only potential, for inde
pendent personal volition: the one human capacity above all
others that gives both interest and meaning to the literary
records of conflicts between man and roan, man and the world,
or within man himself.
It can hardly surprise us to find that
the subject of will— explicitly and literally— has engaged the
interest of authors as diverse as Flaubert, Butler, Goncharov,
Tolstoy, Dostoevsky, Ibsen, . . . (Farber 1966, pp. 29-30).
The dearth of relevant material on the will in the areas of philosophy,
psychology and other areas of specialization forces the reader to turn
to literature in order to gain meaningful insights into the nature of
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will.

Dostoevsky, as Farber pointed out, is one of those, authors who

was interested in the will,

Delimitations
This study is not intended to be a comprehensive examination of
Dostoevsky's literary output.

It is concerned solely with the develop

ment of one character in one novel, i.e., Stavrogin in The Possessed.
This character is the major focus of this study because his development,
more so than that of any other character in the novel, illuminates the
relationship which exists between the will and the learning process.
Therefore, the other characters in the novel are of interest only inso
far as they affect this development.

In addition, even though other

works of Dostoevsky are, upon occasion, cited, this is done solely in
order to shed light on the development of Stavrogin,

Limitations
The concept of will which in utilized in this study has been
extracted from the work of but two authors:

Peterson and Schrag.

Although other authors, such as Farber and May, have written exten
sively about the will, they have not done so in the systematic and
thorough manner of Schrag and Peterson.

The concept of learning has

been extracted, primarily, from the work of Peterson.

Other writers

who contributed to the formulation of this concept, albeit to a lesser
degree, are Kneller, Buber and Morris.

Design and Organization of the Study
A definition of terms completes chapter I.

Chapter II is a

review of the literature which, in addition to concerning itself with

the critical commentary having to do with the character of Stavrogin,
examines the maimer in which the concepts of will and learning process
have been handled by a number of writers.

Chapter III consists of an

examination of Dostoevsky's epistemology, or theory of knowledge.

As

will be pointed out in the Definition of Terms section, Dostoevsky's
philosophical stance is similar to that adopted by that group of indi
viduals commonly referred to as Christian existentialists.

In chapter

III, the relationship between Dostoevsky and Christian existentialism
will be further clarified.

It is important that the nature of this

relationship be understood because it is the contention of this study
that an existential framework is the ideal instrument for examining
and clarifying Dostoevsky's concern with the will, a concern which was
pointed out by Friedman in the Need for Study section.

Existentialism,

which is, above all else, a philosophy of freedom, is best suited for
an examination of a concept which is inextricably connected with the
concept of freedom, i.e., the will.
sections.
life.

Chapter IV is divided into two

The first section consists of an overview of Stavrogin's

This overview details, in a chronological manner, the major

events in Stavrogin's life and, in so doing, lays the foundation for
the analysis of Stavrogin's life.
tion of chapter IV.

This analysis forms the second sec

This analysis focuses on the effect that the learn

ing process, in this case the relationship between pupil (Stavrogin) and
teacher (Stephan), had on Stavrogin’s future development.

An analysis

of such a concrete situation sheds light on the way in which learning
process and will interact.

Chapter V which is grounded in the examina

tion of Stavrogin's educational development suggests ways in which the
relationship between the will, and the learning process may be enhanced.
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Definition of Terms
The two key concepts in this study are "learning process" and
"will."

Even though the two concepts are inextricably related, the

relationship will, for clarity's sake, be broken down into two compo
nent parts:
1.

As pointed out in the Need for Study section, the relation

ship between student and teacher is the most important component of the
learning process.

The function of the teacher in this process has been

stated by Wynne:
The truly creative teacher . . . must be willing to recog
nize, above all, the worth and dignity of students: he must
provide adequate support for efforts of self-determination and
direction; he must be the resource from whom the student can
secure the necessary direction (Wynne 1970, p. x) .
The relationship which exists between student and teacher should dupli
cate the "reciprocally confirming relationship" which Friedman referred
to in his discussion of Dostoevsky's philosophy, a relationship which
entails a commitment on the part of the individual to those with whom
he is involved.

This kind of relationship facilitates the exploration

and understanding of ideas.
To learn with the student by experiencing a common per
spective of meaning of inherent potentialities of an idea is
to apprehend the meaningfulness of a relationship which holds
value to be the embodiment, of truth.
It is upon this working
premise the creative teacher is able to realize his own poten
tiality (Peterson 1970, p. 21).
Growth takes piace_when one individual enters into a relationship with
another in order to explore the world of ideas.

The relationship with

the other is extremely important because, as Friedman points out:
" . . . our knowledge of things is for the most part mediated through
the minds of others" (Friedman 1960, p. 178).

Man exists in a state
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of relationship.

Learning takes place wher. two individuals freely enter

into a relationship in order to exploie those ideas which have a bearing
on their existexrce.

This kind of intellectual exploration enables the

individual to perceive the connections which exist between id^as and the
bearing these connections have on the individual's existence.
2.

Learning entails an act of commitment on the part of both

teacher and student.

Commitment constitutes an act of will for the will

is, above all else, the agency of direction and commitment:

"...

it

is the will which continually insists upon the mind being actively
engaged in the learning process" (Peterson 1977b, p. 16).
by Peterson, will is:

"...

As defined

an integral part of the mind which is

dependent on interaction between the cognitive and the affective,
together with the conative" (Peterson 1977b).
will in interaction.

"Conative" refers to the

The will can be looked upon as a way of perceiving.

This means that the reactions of mind will, by definition, vary from
individual to individual since no two individuals perceive the world in
exactly the same way.
Schrag .looks upon the will as an agent of decision and action
which, in order to function effectively, must remain in league with "the
intellectual-theoretical posturing of world experience" (Schrag 1969,
p. 103) as well as "sentinent world experience" (Schrag 1969, p. 103).
In other words, the will interacts with both the cognitive and the
affective.
Both Peterson and Schrag look upon the will as a determinative.
As such it is "a directive" (Peterson 1977a, p. 119).

The mind Is to

be viewed as a process wherein the will, the cognitive, and the affecfive act upon, in an__interrelated manner, data which they have reeeived

10

via the senses.
of commitment.

The will, in the context of this process, is the agent
Selecting fror. the options which the, cognitive and the

affective are continually casting up before it, the will selects a
course of action and commits itself to it.

It must be kept in mind

throughout that the will is more than a mediator between the cognitive
and the affective:
It (will) is neither primarily intellectual nor primarily
emotive; nor is it half of each. Will stakes out its own
region of deployment and becomes manifest as a continuous
development of behavior with its peculiar intentional field
and distinctive meaning (Schrag 1969, p. 103).
Will is a "basic phenomenon" (Schrag 1969, p. 103), a pivotal aspect of
personality which plays a central role in any, and all, acts of the indi
vidual.

Will is "the pivotal presupposition of both existence and truth"

(Peterson 1977a, p. 119).

It is:

"...

a field of moral activity in

which various styles of life can be assumed, arising out of the possible
configurations of experience" (Schrag 1969, p. 106).

Will .is that which

determines the nature of one ’s lifestyle, i.e., it determines the choices
which define who one is.

One is defined through one's acts and it is the

will which decides which actions one performs.

Experience, as Peterson

points out, plays a central role in this process in that it is through
experiencing that the individual becomes aware of the options which are
open to him:
p. 69).

"All learning begins with experience" (Peterson 1977a,

To learn is to become aware of what one can become.

In decid

ing upon a particular option, a particular lifestyle, the individual
becomes aware of himself as a deciding being who is engaged in a quest
for meaning.

To decide is to create oneself.

create meaning.

To create oneself is to

The will decides and, in so doing, binds the self to

the project which it, the will, has decided upon.

As a result of this

commitment "reference to the self” (Schrag 1969, p. 107) germinates and

develop '
The self is not given prior to its projects,
It does not
antedate its actions.
It emerges with its projects and
its actions and first discovers itself in them. The phe
nomenon of willing . . . announces its resident self
(Schrag 1969, p. 108).
It is through deciding that man becomes aware of himself as a creature
who is capable of making decisions.
becomes aware of who one is:

In deciding, one creates oneself,

"It is only through the historical advance

of the decision-making process that the self comes to a stand, consti
tutes itself, and finds itself within its commitment" (Schrag 1969,
p. 108).
The freedom of the will is not unlimited.
will as the agent of decision and commitment.

Schrag refers to the

However, not all courses

of action decided upon by the will can be actualized.

As Schrag points

out, the will’s ability to execute a course of action is finite and
conditioned:

"Nc action ;s absolutely within my power.

It is condi

tioned by my personal and social past, by the demands of my present
environment, and by my limited perception! of future possibilities"
(Schrag 1969, p. 102).
always conditional.

Total freedom is an impossibility.

Freedom is

The will, in order to function properly, must

acknowledge, and operate within, the limitations imposed upon it.
As pointed out earlier, the will is a "directive" (Peterson
1977a, p. 119).

As such, it projects itseLf into the future while,

at one and the same time, remaining aware of the lessons of the past.
"The commited will apprehends time as a horizon for its decisive
action and engagement" (Schrag 1969, p. 105).

In deciding upon a

course of action in the present, the will is cognizant not merely

of the present but of the past and the future as well.

In deciding one

is assuming that certain things will occur in the future as a result or
what one does now:

"In decision the future is anticipated, possibilities

of what might be are envisaged, and goals and purposes are entertained"
(Schrag 1969, p. 105).
beyond the present.

A disordered will is one which is unable to see

For such a will time is little more than an uncon

nected and meaningless series of "nows."

Such a will is unable to grasp

the relationship which exists between past, present, and future.

deny

the future is to deny meaning, and in so doing one ends up by den} .ag
oneself.

The past is important in that past actions limit pres? c ones

as well as providing the individual with a glimpse of his pot.
"...

iality.

in remembering the past the decided self continues to grow in

wisdom and stature, cognizant of both its finitude and transcendence"
(Schrag 1969, p. 105).

A will which denies the importance of past and

future exists in a vacuum and in so doing ends up by destroying itself.
Although, as Schrag pointed out, the will does not consist of
equal parts "affective" and "cognitive," it does function best when an
equilibrium exists betX'/een itself and these other two domains of mind.
"To experience, the mind must be fully functional, that is, there must
be a balance among its domains, namely, the cognitive, conative and
affective" (Peterson 1977b, p. 9).

However, it is possible that one of

the_ two— "cognltive" or "affective" — -couId take precedenee over the
other.

In an individual in whom the cognitive dominates, the world _is

reduced, for the most part, to a coflection of abstractions.
uals become transformed into labels.
to be in total control of hir

Individ-■

Such an individual feels the need

6 and the world he inhabits.

In order

to achieve that kind of co1' .ol, he perceives himself, as well as the

external world, as a thing, or collection of things.

Such an individual

is similar to the schizoid intellectual described by Guntrip.
an individual:

For such

"Life is the pursuit of truth, not love, the thinking

out of an ideology; and ideas become more important than people" (Guntrip 1976, p. 64).

Such an approach to life is resorted to in order to

deny the reality of the feeling-self.

Abstractions take the place of

feelings because they are not threatening.

Such an individual views

language, for example, as a weapon; a tool which he resorts to in order
to manipulate others.

He is continually constructing scenarios; pre

planning encounters with others.
to the level of an object.

In so doing, he is reducing the other

Objectification of others can be looked

upon as a form of "defusing."

Human beings are threatening.

Objects

are not.
In some Instances, the affective takes precedence over the cog
nitive.

This kind of relationship gives- rise to uncontrolled hedonism.

The individual is concerned with but one thing, i.e., satisfaction of
his every desire.

Morality, insofar as this type of individual is con

cerned, is nothing more than a meaningless abstraction.

As in the case

of the cognitive-dominated individual, others are looked upon as things
which the individual manipulates in order to gratify his every whin.
This type of individual places no constraints on his own behavior.

In

a way, he looks upon the external world as being little more than an
extension of himself.

He is unable to differentiate between self and

other.
In both instances, one is dealing with reactions to an experi
ence of emotional flooding which usually occurs at_ a relatively early
age.

Boyer, in his article on the etiology of schizophrenia, states
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that a child possesses an "inborn stimulus barrier" (Boyer 1971, p. 371)
which protects him against internal, as weil as external, excitations.
However, in addition to his own stimulus barrier, the child is usually
in need of an external one which is usually provided by the mother.

In

some instances, particularly those where the protection is inadequate,
the child might seek out a substitute for the mother.

In Stavrogin's

case, for example, the relationship between mother and child was never
very close.

At the age of eight, he was placed in the care of Stephan.

Stephan, however, instead of providing the child with the protection
denied him by his mother, did the exact opposite.

He added to

Stavrogin’s difficulties by adding, to a traumatic degree, to an
already overwhelming sensory input.

This failure to protect gives

rise to a form of traumatization which is directly attributable to
the child's inability to cope with the stimuli to which he is con
stantly exposed.

This traumatization hinders normal development.

The cognitive-dominant response to this kind of experience represents
a form of reaction formation.

The overwhelming emotional experience

causes the individual to equate the affective with that which is
destructive of self.

The affective-dominant response represents a

surrendering to what the individual perceives as the overwhelming
and irresistable. demands of the affectiee._Since he cannot ade
quately defend himself against the affective, he ends up by iden
tifying w ith it totally.

The affective becomes the only reality.

Boyer, in the article cited in the above paragraph, was dis
cussing the development of schizoid states in children.

There is a

close connection between the so-called schizoid state and the problem

of the will in that in both instances problems arise when a split between
the cognitive and affective occurs.

"in The Penguin Dictionary of Psy

chology , Drever defines 'schizoid' as a 'personality-type tending toward
dissociation of the emotional from the intellectual life:
sonality’" (Quoted in Guntrip 1976, pp. 95-96).
schizoid states, emphasizes that:

a shut-in per

Guntrip, in his book on

"The significance of human living lies

in object-relationships, and only in such terms can our life be said to
have a meaning, for without object-relations the ego itself cannot
develop" (Guntrip 1976, pp. 20-21).

This is a conclusion with which

Peterson, Schrag, and Dostoevsky would concur.
lie in the area of object relationships.

The schizoid's problems

"The schizoid condition con

sists in the first place in an attempt to cancel external objectreiati<.ns and live in a detached and withdrawn way" (Guntrip 1976,
p. 19).

In examining the works of individuals concerned with the prob

lem of schizophrenia, therefore, light will be shed on the problem of
the character of Stavrogin, reference w'ill be made to the work of
authors such as Iaing and Guntrip.
Schrag and Peterson, in their discussion of will, frequently
allude to the term existential.

In addition, Dostoevsky's philosophi

cal orientation was similar to that of those individuals commonly
referred to as existentialists.

"Indeed, Dostoevsky, Kafka, Proust

are sources for existential thinking as much as the professional phi
losophers . . . ” (Harper 1972, p. 6).

Since existentialism plays such

an important part in this study, it is necessary to articulate its
major themes.

This is essential because, as Frank has pointed out:

"So vague remains the boundaries of the term 'existential' that even
figures as widely separated in time as Socrates and Baudelaire have
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been interpreted ir the light of such existential notions as commitment,
nothingness, and authenticity" (Clive 1972, p. xiii).

The true existen

tialist believes "in himself as a self-determining being" (Peterson 1970,
p. 15).

The true existentialist realizes that he is a free being whose

choices define him:

"He believes he possesses the freedom of will; he

makes himself, both with the assistance of others and things:

he has

potentiality, the actuality of which depends upon the decisions he makes
and not the conditions which confront him" (Peterson 1970, p. 15).

From

an existential point of view, man is a choosing subjectivity who must
assume responsibility for his choices.

The existential man creates him

self through the choices which he freely makes.

To choose is to create

meaning.
Dostoevsky is most closely associated with that group of existen
tialists commonly referred to as Christian existentialists.

This asso

ciation is most clearly revealed in the sayings of Father Zossima, a
character in The Brothers Karamazov.
study of Russian thought, " . . .

As Masaryk points out in his

we are . . . offered the very cate

chism of Dostoevsky's religious philosophy from the mouth of the monk
Zoslma" (Masaryk 1961, Vol, III, p. 15).

Dostoevsky himself, in a let

ter he wrote concerning the character of Father Zossima, stated:
myself hold the same opinions he expresses . . . "

"I

(Quoted in Gibson

1973, p. 197).
According to the Christlan __exisj.entlallsts, God is the Divine
Being who has created all else.

This God has left man in a darkness

from which he can escape only if he chooses to act in such a wav that
his _behavior wi11 lead him back_to God. Man can find God only by
choosing to love others, i.e., his fellow men.

Father Zossima

stresses the importance of love when he states:
I ponder 'What is hell?'

"Fathers and teachers,

I maintain that it is the suffering of being

unable to love" (Dostoevsky 1955, p. 336).
will never find his way back to God.

He who is unable to love

This love enables the individual

to transcend himself and, in so doing, enables him to re-establish
contact with God.
manner:

"...

Harper expresses the same idea in the following
a man is so astonished that someone loves him that

he feels that he must attribute this ’grace’ to a third who is beside
them and whose divine existence he assumed for the occasion" (Harper
1966, p. 81).

Or, as Buber puts it:

"In each ’you' we meet the eter

nal ’You’" (Quoted in Harper 1966, p. 80).
divine.

To love is to perceive the

Father Zossima makes this very clear when he states:

Love a man even in his sin, for that is the semblance of
Divine Love and is the highest love on e*-rth. Love all God’s
creation, the whole and every grain of sand in it. Love every
loaf, every ray of God’s light. Love the animals. Love the
plants, love everything. If you love everything you will per
ceive the divine mystery in things. Once you perceive it, you
will begin to comprehend it better each day (Dostoevsky 1955,
p. 332).
Choice plays an extremely important part in Christian existentialism.

God does not force the individual to love others.

not make men's decisions for him.

He does

Each individual is free to choose.

He can choose to seek after God, a search which entails opening oneself up to one's fellow man, or he can turn his back on God and, in
so doing, turn his back on all others.

As Zernov points out in his

discussion of Dostoevsky's concept of Christianity:
This emphasis on freedom is another keynote of Dostoevsky's
interpretation of Christ. Christ can only be found by those
who are not afraid of freedom. . . . Only Christ, freely and
unconditionally accepted by a human being, can destroy evil and
restore unity and brotherhood among man (Zernov 1944, p. 108).

Zossima emphasizes the fact of man's freedom in his discussion of those
who have turned away from God:
Oh, there are some who i.emain proud and fierce even in
hell, in spite of their certain knowledge and contemplation
of the absolute truth; there are some fearful ones who have
given tnemselves over to Satan and his proud spirit entirely.
For such, Hell is voluntary and ever-consuming; they are tor
tured by their own choice. For they have cursed themselves,
cursing God and life (Dostoevsky 1955, p. 337).
Friedman, in commenting on this passage, states:

"Thus evil and freedom

remain, but the responsibility for them rests with man in his irrevoc
able freedom and not with God" (Friedman 1970, p. 276).
It is the contention of most, if not all, schools of existential
ism that suffering is an integral part of human existence.
grips with suffering is to grow as an individual.
is tantamount to running away from oneself:

To come to

To run away from it

"Dostoevsky shows that suf

fering lies in the very nature of man as a free and morally responsible
being . . . only those who are not afraid of pain are matured and truly
free people" (Zernov 1944, p. 93).
Mai: is a moral being who is perpetually obsessed with the strug
gle between good and evil.
with authg‘r>r-t

It is man's moral life which endows his self
in the context

sM

existential ^

is the power which enables man to use or abuse his freedom.

To deny the

existence of good is to isolate oneself from all others as well as from
God and oneself.
Dostoevsky firmly believed that man contained within himself a
demonic realm as well as an "angelic principle" (Reinhardt 1969, p. 43).
Both his (Dostoevsky's) psychologic and ontological descrip
tion are permeated by the element of the moral or the ethical,
the struggle between good and evil . . . man finds himself
inescapably confronted with the dilemma of good and evil . . .
(Reinhardt 196°, p. 43).
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He who does not choose the path of good inevitably ends up entangled in
'the web of evil" (Reinhardt 1969, p. 43).

In choosing the path of evil,

the individual isolates himself from God and his fellow men.

In thus

abusing his freedom 'morality is deprived of every foundation and liberty
turns into a chaotic amoralism" (Reinhardt 1969, p. 43).
His (Dostoevsky's) conclusion was that, having freed himself
from belief in God, man was bound to deify himself, to put ~
himself above all moral laws, to proclaim that everything
was permissible, for if God did not exist then man was the
lord of creation. This assertion of his own absolute free
dom brought man face to face with the presence in his soul
of dark and irrational forces which dragged man from his
high pedestal axxd enslaved him by establishing their iron
control over his personality. As soon as man declared that
everything was lawful he became a helpless victim of his own
passions, fears and doubts. He found himself in the clutch
of his impotence and corruption, and the only act left to
his freedom was suicide (Zernov 1944, p. 90).
To choose the path of good is to elevate oneself to the "heights of
spiritual transfiguration" (Reinhardt 1969, p. 44).
hand, constitutes a flight from God.

Evil, on the other

In denying God one is denying

one’s moral nature which is the same as saying that one is denying
oneself.

"As a condition of the individual soul evil is the conclu

sive shirking cf direction, of the total orientation of the soul by
v h 1f'

-f

p. 104).
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Man must choose which path he shall take.

makes determines the nature of his self:

~ !

•' r*

The choice he

"The existentialist is aware

that he has been created as a human being; from this point he becomes
the creator of the self, the finisher and qualifier of his existence"
(Peterson 1970, p. 14).

God, who has created all of mankind, has

endowed each individual with the freedom to choose which direction
his existence shall take.

20

m

order to better understand the nature of Christian extential-

ism, it is necessary to define key concepts.
faith.

One of these concepts is

Faith entails a movement from the act of commitment to the real

ization of the fulfillment of commitment which is the acceptance of
responsibility.

It is through assuming responsibility for one's com

mitments that man gains his freedom.
Faith entails a belief in that which cannot be empirically
validated, i.e., the existence of God.

As Edie points out, "faith is

not subject to scientific demonstration and . . .

is impervious to

complete rational or logical justification" (Edie 1963, p. 9).
Faith constitutes a transcendent act which enables the individ
ual to move outside of himseIf and towards other men and God:
. . . it (faith) is an action, not only in the sense of a
practical doing, but primarily in the sense of a becoming
by which the self is established in a dynamic relationship
of continual self-transcendence towards itself, the world,
other men and God (Edie 1963, p. 9).
Faith in God is inseparable from faith in one's fellow men.
"Only through the relationship with man as 'Thou’ does the 'I* find his
freedom and fulfillment.

By loving others, man transcends his own

limited self. . . . God is the absolute 'Thou' . . . (who)
encountered in man's personal engagement with Him" (Misiak and Sexton
1973, p. 73).

The truly free man is one who enters into relationships

with the full weight of his being.

Inherent in this act of commitment

to others is the recognition that such commitment constitutes the high
est good.

In affirming the individuality of others one is affirming

on e ’s own individuality and, in so doing, reaching out to God.
In addition to the positive form of faith which has just been
described, there exists a negative faith whose salient characteristic
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is the objectification of others.

Such an individual looks upon others

as Tittle more than surfaces or things.

This particular individual, in

negating the subjectivity of others, negates his own subjectivity.
denying others, he denies himself.

In

As wat pointed out earlier, to cut

oneself off from others is to cut oneself off from the good.

Such an

individual leads a directionless existence in which God is conspicuous
by His absence.

For such an individual "liberty turns into a chaotic

amoralism" (Reinhardt 1969, p. A3).

He becomes a "helpless victim of

his own passions, fears and doubts" (Zernov 194A, p. 90).
A concept which is closely related to that of faith is intuition.
Intuition is:

"...

the act of pure consciousness which immediately

recognizes the unquestionable validity of particular form of evidence
when it ’sees’ it" (Sadler 1969, p. 27).

An intuition is a flash of

wisdom— a perfect moment when time stops and the pattern of the uni
verse is suddenly revealed.

It is as though, as Dostoevsky put it,

"time suddenly stops and becomes eternal" (Quoted in Harper 1972,
p. 33).
is.

It is a time when everything can be comprehended for what it

The individual suddenly becomes aware of underlying meaning, of
....vc pointing to cue existence of an all-encompassing pattern.

These moments bring home to the individual, in a powerful manner, a
sense of harmony and symmetry.
Transcendence entails a movement beyond one's specific location
in time and space:
The self knows the world . . . because it stands outside both
itself and the world, which means that it cannot understand
itself except as it is understood from beyond itself and the
world. This essential homelessness of the human spirit is
the ground of all religion (Niebuhr 1941, p. 14).

22

What is of crucial importance is the fact that the self makes itself tne
object of its own thought.

In moving outside of itself, the self is more

clearly able to perceive the relationship which exists between itself and
the external world.

This particular mode of perception enables the indi

vidual to perceive the relationship which exists between all things.

In

other words, it makes the individual aware of God because, from a reli
gious point of view, God is the source of harmony and order.
harmony is to perceive God.

To perceive

Intuition and transcendence are inextricably

intertwined in that transcendence gives rise to that intuition, or flash
of knowledge, concerning the Being who is situated at the centre of man's
existence, i.e., God.
Presence "suggests an alteration in everyday temporality" (Sadler
1969, p. 180).

It involves the individual exposing himself to reality.

In exposing himself, he is allowing his space and time to be invar’
the other-as-subject.
of the other.

Simultaneously, he is irvadlr,,

Two Indlvidua’

space and time

,acu.itielves sharing of one another:

xs a moment which transcends individualistic struc
tures. I sense his presence; but it is a presence which
fills my world and my time. When I receive his presence
into my world, it is no longer his alone. It is a moment
of shared presence; the moment belongs to us (Sadler 1969,
p. 181).
The moment of meeting, which is a meeting of shared presence, transcends
the limits of self.

In communing with another, one is, from a religious

point of view, communing with God.

Shared presence constitutes a moment

of love "which carries man beyond his individual fate into a reality of
personal fullness, into eternity" (Sadler 1969, p. 181).

By engaging in

a relationship characterized by hope, trust and love one is transcending
the limitations of self and reaching out for the divine.

Father Zossima

states:

'Love a raan even in his sin, for that is the semblance of Divine

Love and is the highest love on earth. . . .

If you love everything, you

will perceive the divine mystery in things" (Dostoevsky 1955, p. 332).
Presence entails love, and it is love which enables man to truly under
stand himself:

"The full truth of man emerges only when one confronts

another in the dual mode of the loving We" (Sadler 1969, p. 182).
Self, in the context of this study, is not a static psychic
structure.

It is:

"...

a unique centre of meaningful experience

growing in the medium of personal relationships" (Guntrip 1976, p. 127).
The self is a unifying force which transforms the various experiences
which it initiates into a meaningful wholeness which is unique to that
particular self.

It is an active force which, in a religious context,

is continually striving towards spiritual fulfillment, i.e., communion
with God.

The self is a process whose salient characteristic is a

striving after transcendence.

It is a conscious subjectivity which

freely makes choices which it hopes will lead it to God.
One cannot: speak of self without at one and the same time making
reference to Being.

As Marcel has stated:

"Being is a sort of ontologi

cal permanence, to which we are linked and owing to whose endurance we
ourselves endure; it is a permanence which implies or demands a history"
(Quoted in Reinhardt 1960, pp. 216-217).
other things.

God is the Being who creates all

By "ontological permanence" Marcel is referring to the fact

that God, who is the essence from which all else originates, always has
been and always will be.

His presence continually manifest itself

through his creations, i.e., man.

It is an active presence which is

continually calling upon mail to seek out its ultimate source, i.e.,
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God himself.

To deny this call is to deny not only God but oneself as

well.
Marcel makes use of the word ontology.
with the nature of being:

Ontology concerns itself

. . t o perceive from an ontological base

is to determine the nature of existents as well as their potential"
(Peterson 1977a, p. 81).
Reality, or the real world, refers to the world of the "existing"
(Kneller 1953, p. 3).

Being is the only reality.

From a religious

point of view, God would represent Ultimate Reality since he is the
Being from which all other beings originate.
Epistemology refers to that:

"...

branch of philosophy which

investigates the origin, structure, methods and validity of knowledge"
(Wood 1960, p. 94).

In speaking of an individual's epistemology, what

is being referred to is that particular individual^ theory of knowledge.
Reason refers to that faculty of the mind which is concerned with
the elucidation of those experiences undergone by the self.

It is con

tinually in the process of evaluating, and reevaluating, that which the
self has experienced.
Experience is synonomous with awareness.

According to Buber,

the individual experiences, or is aware of, the world in two different
ways.
world.

Gne form of awareness has to do with the objectifylng of the
This involves the individual detaching himself from his sur

roundings and viewing the world as a collection of objects:

"...

the

I-It world is one of utilization, orientation, separation and detachment
of the subject,vis-a-vis an object in which the subject manipulates,
exploits or uses the object . . . "

(Mundackal 1977, p. 87).

The other

form of awareness Buber discusses entails involvement in the world.

The

emphasis is placed on perceiving the world as being inhabited by othersas-subjects.

The individual is actively engaged in establishing rela

tionships with these others.

This particular type of awareness, from

the Christian point of view, is superior to the first in that the indi
vidual, in reaching out to others is, at one and the same time, reach
ing out to God.
Numinous refers to a state of being during which the individual
feels as though he was in direct contact with something sacred.

This

feeling, which does not lend itself to rational analysis, is closely
tied in with two concepts which have previously been defined, i.e.,
intuition and transcendence.

It is as though the mind has suddenly

come into direct contact with God and, in so doing, transcended its
limitations.

CHAPTER II

REVIEW OF LITERATURE

This chapter is divided into two sections.

The first consists

of an examination of those critical works relating specifically to the
moral and educational development of Stavrogin.

The second consists of

an examination of those works having to do with the will and the learn
ing process.

Stavrogin
The salient characteristic of the critical literature pertaining
to Stavrogin is its uniformity.

The critics discussed in this section

are in essential agreement in regard to such aspects of Stavrogin*s per
sonality as the nature of the affliction from which he suffers as well
as the root causes, or causes, of that affliction.

The most important

points of agreement can be summarized in the following manner:

Nature of Affliction
The affliction from which Stavrogin suffers can be broken down
into several component parts.

The critics discussed in this section

have all discussed one or more of these component parts in their com
mentaries.

The following five sub-divisions constitute a complete

picture of Stavrogin*s affliction:
Boredom.

In "The Masks of Stavrogin," an article concerned

solely with the development of Stavrogin, Frank states:

"Stavrogin
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is a victir of the famous tnal du siecle, the ail-engulfing ennui that
naunts the literature of the first half of the nineteenth century"
(Frank 1969, p, 683).

Ennui, according to Frank, invariably gives

rise to "one or another form of moral perversion" (Frank 1969, p. 683).
In the case of Stavrogin, the moral perversion takes the form of child
molestation, i.e., the young girl, Matryosha.

In addition to violating

Matryosha, he sits by and does nothing while she is commiting suicide
in the room next to his.

The boredom which pervades his entire being

prevents hifo from going to her aid.
Kuhn, in his discussion of ennui, defines it as:

"...

the

state of emptiness that the soul feels when it is deprived of interest
in action, life and the world (be it this world or another)" (Kuhn 1976,
p. 13).

He stresses the fact that it plays a central role in many of

Dostoevsky’s characters, i.e., Stavrogin:
A tension-laden ennui leads the characters of Dostoevsky
to emotional self-laceration and to the torture of others;
Stavrogin, in The Possessed, exhibits a demonic nihilism that
can find satisfaction neither in the total destruction with
which Piotr Stepanovich Verhovenski tempts him nor in the
sainthood that the Elder Tikhon holds out as an ideal (Kuhn
1976, p. 256),
Clive, in his study of Russian fiction, emphasizes the selfdestructive boredom which is such a salient characteristic of
Stavrogin's character.

Like Frank, he states that this kind of

boredom, or ennui, proliferated in nineteenth century literature.
In Stavrogin's case, the boredom is so extreme that it is slowly
driving him mad.

The spread of this particular brand of boredom is

linked, by Clive, to the rise of the scientific intellectual.

The

scientific intellectual, according to Clive, is one who stresses
the primacy of detached observation and scientific abstractions
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ever "direct lived experience" (Clive 1972, p. 76).

Stavrogin:

" . .

carries this cult of dispassionate objectivity to an extreme by detach
ing his own stake from the thrust of his most persuasive arguments
(Clive 1972, p. 76).

Stavrogin's similarity to the scientific intel

lectual described by Clive is noted by Reinhardt:

"He (Stavrogin)

observes the consequences of his actions as a detached spectator, or
like a scientist who observes the results of his experiments" (Rein
hardt 1969, p. 65).

Stavrogin, in common with the scientific intel

lectual described by Clive, no longer takes pride in "local traditions
and associations" (Clive 1972, p. 72).

His is a rootless existence

which exists in a vacuum.
Stavrogin’s boredom is so intense that it transforms the world
into a stale and meaningless place peopled by individuals whose ideas
and feelings are as stale and contemptible as the world they inhabit:
It is worth noting that Stavrogin's boredom is far from
being totally "subjective." Rather his whole world of ideas
and intentions has become stale to him within the context of
his everyday activities.
In other words, not only is
Stavrogin's psyche disturbed by x^hat might be. called a sick
ness of the soul but this disturbance reaches out, so to
speak, to distort his whole sense of reality (Clive 1972,
p. 76).
Clive compares this particular brand of boredom to a corrosive acid
which eats away and destroys anything with which it comes into contact.
It gives rise to an intense self-hatred which, in turn, gives rise to
intense hatred of the external world.
intertwined with intense hatred.

Intense boredom is extricably

Stavrogin, for example, reacts to

anything and everything with an intense, hatred:

a hatred which would

enable him, without a second's hesitation, to destroy himself and the
world simultaneously, assuming he possessed the power to do so.

Stavrogin's Confession, as Clive points out, provides us with several
examples of the relationship which existed between boredom and hatred
of self and others.
stating:

For example, Stavrogin begins his Confession by

"I could have hanged myself out of sheer boredom" (Quoted by

Clive 1971, p. 76).

Stavrogin goes on to say:

"I just felt I'd have

liked to put gunpowder under the four corners of the world and blow the
whole thing sky-high. . . .

I would have done it without malice, simply

out of boredom" (Quoted in Clive 1972, p. 76).

Stavrogin, as Clive

points out, is "a tormented individual, almost crazed by his condition
of uprootedness and boredom" (Clive 1972, p. 75).
De Jonge, in commenting on Stavrogin, states that he is charac
terized by a:

"...

spiteful indifference to a world he knows too

well as stale, flat and unprofitable" (de Jonge 1975, p. 132).

From

Stavrogin's point of view, the world is a sterile place in which nothing
is possible and nothing is of any value.

Ennui, as de Jonge points out:

. . . is a mood of spiritual dispersal which saps the will,
negating everything except for a belief in ennui itself.
All forms of meaningful activity become impossible and man
is left with nothing but his sense of time's passing
(de Jonge 1975, p. 40).
The individual, in an attempt to extricate himself from the boredom in
which he finds himself mired, engages in extreme forms of behavior.
However, as de Jonge points out, such attempts, instead of alleviating
boredom, merely exacerbate it:

"...

he (Stavrogin) has so overabused

his capacity for experiencing sensation, for instinctive response, that
it is worn out, no longer able to respond.

The nerves are dead . . . "

(de Jonge 1975, p. 136).
Winegarten, in her study of writers and revolution, states that
Stavrogin is an individual who engages in criminal acts in a futile

attempt to shake off the boredom which is slowly suffocating him.
According to her:

"Stavrogin is revealed as a frigid and sterile

monster of moral indifference" (Winegarten 1974, p. 207).

Stavrogin

engages in acts of debauchery "a la Sade out of sheer boredom" (Winegar ten 1974, p. 206).
Howe also emphasizes the important part that boredom
far as Stavrogin's character is concerned.
is characterized by:

"...

plays inso

According to Howe, Stavrogin

acedia, that torpor of the spirit which pro

vides the greatest resistance to God because it lacks the power to
resist anything" (Howe 1962, p. 62).

Stavrogin’s boredom is so intense

that it impairs his ability to make moral choices.
Jackson states, in his study of Dostoevsky's Underground Man,
that both Stavrogin and the Underground Man are characterized by acute
s :ates of boredom.

Like the Underground Man, Stavrogin is one who has

been overwhelmed by boredom to the point where:

"The features of his

persona]ity have become frozen like the features of his face" (Jackson
1958, p. 56).
Reinhardt, in his study of the theological novel, states that
Stavrogin, when he does act, does so, more often than not, out of sheer
boredom, a boredom which is so intense that Stavrogin is unable to shake
it off:

"When he (Stavrogin) occasionally does spring into action, it

is from sheer boredom" (Reinhardt 1969, p. 67).

Reinhardt goes on to

state that "his (Stavrogin's) inertia has deep roots in his being"
(Reinhardt 1969, p. 67).
Friedman concurs with the other critics

when he states that

Stavrogin is a "bored and listless observor" (Friedman 1970, p. 174).
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Divided Personality.
ing Stavrogin, states:

The narrator of The Possessed, in describ

''People said that his face reminded them of a

mask" (Dostoevsky 1965, p. 57).

His face is so described, according to

Frank, in order to emphasize the fact that beneath the beautiful facade
there is to be found the "horror of evil and corruption" (Frank 1969,
p. 670).

Clive, in a work entitled The Romantic Enlightenment, dis

cusses one of the central concerns of nineteenth century literature,
namely, the rift between the cognitive and affective aspects of man's
being:

"Nineteenth century literature is filled with expressions of

this daemonic rift between insensitive knowing and waywTard feeling"
(Clive 1960, p. 29).

Stavrogin, according to Clive, is a prime example

of the divided man who played such an important part in nineteenth cen
tury literature:

"Stavrogin's Confession in Dostoevsky's The Possessed

is perhaps the last word on the subject?' (Clive 1960, p. 29).

In a later

work, Clive summarizes the paradox that is Stavrogin in the following
manner:
He turns to dissipation for an anodyne, but not being a
sybarite, he cannot enjoy losing himself in mere plea
sure. Not being a pragmatist either, he proceeds to
act outrageously in society (Clive 1972. p. 79).
Steiner, in his discussion of Dostoevsky and Tolstoy, states
that Stavrogin appears to combine in his person characteristics of
both Christ and the Antichrist.

Steiner attempts to explain this

apparent paradox by surmising that Dostoevsky, in portraying Stavrogin
in this way, was attempting to demonstrate the innate duality of God:
In imagining him (Stavrogin), Dostoevsky may have succumbed
to an ancient and desperate suspicion.
If God is the crea
tor of the universe, he is, by the same token of entirety,
the creator of evil. If all grace is encompassed in His

being, so is all inhumanity. . . . There saem to be moments
in the novel in which Stavrogin conveys to us a tragic appre
hension of the duality of God (Steiner 1971, pp. 315-316).
Peace, in his discussion of Dostoevsky's major novels, states
that "the depiction of Stavrogin reveals a duality at every point;
every facet reveals a great enigma" (Peace 1975, p. 180).

Peace says

essentially the same thing that Steiner does when he states that
Stavrogin "embraces within himself both the saint and the sinner"
(Peace 1975, p. 180).

This duality, according to Peace, would help

to account, at least in part, for Stavrogin's ability to implant con
flicting ideas (atheistic materialism and a form of Christianity) into
two of his disciples, i.e., Shatov and Kirillov, simultaneously.
Stavrogin is both saint and sinner:

Christ and Antichrist.

Friedman, in his work on the literary rebel, points out that
Stavrogin intensified the "alienation and inner division of the Under
ground Man and Raskolnikov" (Friedman 1970, pp. 170-171).

Stavrogin,

according to Friedman, is the divided man par excellence.

Stavrogin’s

being is so helplessly splintered that he is unable to commit himself
to a specific course of action.

Fie is "the divided man as exile. . . .

As a result he must remain ambiguous and perplexing" (Friedman 1970,
p. 172).

According to Friedman, nowhere is the duality of Stavrogin's

character more in evidence than in the Confession episode.

Stavrogin,

according to Friedman, wrote the Confession in a futile attempt to get
out from the boredom which is slowly crushing him to death.

He hopes

that the Confession will elicit a response from the public which will,
in turn, arouse some sort of response in himself.
there is a reaction, or so Stavrogin hopes.
points out:

For every action

However, as Friedman
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This desire for sensation dose not mean that Stavrogin is
indifferent or lacking in despair and a sense of guilt
that might lead to repentance. Rut he is too split to
bring all of himself even into this action of confessing.
His problem is not that he does not believe in anything,
but that he believes in opposites, that he is torn by
extremes. Like love and self-degredation, confession
cannot do for him what he cannot do for himself--make
him give himself over to life as a whole person (Friedman
1970, p. 180).
Stavrogin is engaged in a desperate quest for an external force which
will bring together the disparate aspects of his personality.

What he

fails to realize, however, is that no external force can do for him
what he cannot do for himself, i.e., transform him into a unified
whole.

The division which exists in Stavrogin’s character prevents

him from being able to commit himself to life.
himself out of despair:

"...

Ho ends up killing

the despair of a man with strength

but no direction, a man with passion and potentiality but with no
image of authentic existence" (Friedman 1970, p. 180).
Guerard also emphasizes the duality of Stavrogin’s character.
As he points out:
At times he (Stavrogin) seems merely bereft of will, at,
other to be holding aggression under control, as when,
after Shatov's slap, he holds his hands clasped behind
his back. The hollow man, on a few occasions, seems to
be boiling with criminal energy (Guerard 1976, p. 285).
Stavrogin fluctuates between extremes.

At times he appears to be little

more than a listless husk, an absence.

At other times, he appears to be

on the verge of an intense emotional eruption.

What is paradoxical, as

Guerard points out, is that Stavrogin, even though he seems to be, more
often than out, "absent" from the novel in the sense of not being an
active participant in the action, is the central focus of the novel.
As Guerard points it, "He is like a dead sun about which the planets
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continue to move with borrowed light and heat" (Guerard 1976, p. 286).
Stavrogin embodies in his person the duality and ambiguity which is a
salient characteristic of the novel as a whole.
Isolation from Others.

Wasiolek states:

one" (Quoted in Guerard 1976, p. 286).

"Stavrogin needs no

His isolation from others is

most clearly evidenced, as Clive points out, during the episode when
Stavrogin, knowing that a young girl is hanging herself next door,
"does not interfere for he is reading his paper" (Clive 1960, p. 29).
Harper describes Stavrogin in the following manner:

"He cannot arise

from the self-isolation in which he has entombed his personality"
(Harper 1967, p. 53).

Stavrogin destroys others in a capricious man

ner in order to "see whether by doing so he could take something
seriously" (Harper 1967, p. 69).

In so doing he demonstrates his

distance from others, because only one who is totally isolated from
others would treat those others in such a callous and destructive
manner.

Jackson, like Harper, emphasizes Stavrogin’s "divorce from

the people and the 'living Life'" (Jackson 1958, p. 56).
states:

Reinhardt

". . . he is unable to communicate with others . . . others

cannot communicate with him. . . . He is . . . unable to give himself
to others in devotion and in love" (Reinhardt .1969, p. 67).
Holquist states that Stavrogin is one of those individuals who
is terrified that others might play some p a u in shaping his destiny.
Stavrogin's attitude towards anything external to himself is a combina
tion of fear and abhorrence.

Stavrogin's quest for what Holquist refers

to as "absolute ego" (Holquist 1977, p. 139), an ego which is formed
independently of external forces, human or otherwise, indicates the
exte-

to which Stavrogin is divorced from others.

Stavrogin is
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continually attempting to break free of those patterns which he believes
determine

who he is.

However, "He keeps discovering the power of

structure to subvert his lust for a unique identity" (Holquist 1977,
p. 140).

Stavrogin is unable to accept the fact that identity is to

a large extent the product of interaction with others.

In order to

deny this fact he behaves in an outrageous manner in order to demon
strate his total freedom from external constraints.

He rapes a young

girl and marries a mad woman in order to demonstrate his purported
freedom.

He behaves unconventionally in order to prove that he is

free from all external control, but, ironically, unconventionality
itself soon becomes transformed into one of those stifling patterns
which Stavrogin abhors.
At the end of the novel, Stavrogin has become convinced that
his inability to find a totally unique identity leaves him but one
choice, i.e., suicide.

Having reached what he considers a dead end,

he ends up by commiting suicide.
Acute Self-Consciousness.
can truthfully state:
1960, p. 115).

Like the Underground Man, Stavrogin

"I am extremely self-conscious" (Quoted in Clive

The kind of acute self-consciousness which is character

istic of both Stavrogin and the Underground Man is extremely debilitating
in that it causes the individual to:
. . . muse and brood over himself; before long he enters into
monologues with himself and comes to resent any interruption
as unwarranted, embarrassing, and terribly difficult to bear.
Soon his egocentricity may make him unfit to live with— and
worse, to live with himself (Clive 1960, p. 115).
The extremely self-conscious individual, by virtue of the fact that he
dwells continuously on self, becomes "divorced from reality" (Clive
1960, p. 115).
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Acute self-consciousness gives rise to an intense despair:
"With every increase in the degree of consciousness, and in proportion
to that increase, the intensity of despair increases:

the more con

sciousness, the more intense the despair" (Quoted in Clive 1960,
p. 115).

The despair which acute self-consciousness gives rice to

causes the individual to seek out a transcendent which will enable
him to go beyond the bounds of a world which he finds stale and mean
ingless,

Paradoxically, however, the very same self-consciousness

which prevents the individual from being content with mundane reality,
at one and the same time, prevents him from giving himself over totally
to the transcendent which he is presumably seeking.

Self-consciousness

prevents the individual from moving outside of himself.
out in regard to StavroginTs spiritual quest:

As Frank points

"His quest is a spiritual

experimentation totally preoccupied with itself, totally enclosed within
the ego, and hence incapable of self-surrender to the absolute that it
is presumably seeking" (Frank 1969, p. 669).

Intense self-consciousness

prevent Stavrogin from commiting himself to anything in a total manner.
As de Jonge points out, consciousness is diametrically opposed to
Intensity:

"The greater the degree of consciousness the harder it

becomes to experience the surge of vertigo with which intensity over
whelms its subjects" (de Jonge 1975, p. 132).

Stavrogin craves

intense emotional experiences, but his self-consciousness prevents
him from being able to "let go" to the extent that would be required
if one were to become totally immersed in the kinds of experiences he
so desperately desires.
endows life with meaning.

Intensity of experience relieves tedium and
Those who are unable to experience life

intensely are condemned to a life of sterility.

37

Friedman, in analyzing Stavrogin's self-awareness, states that
it prevents him from being able to engage in an act of genuine repent
ance:

an act which might have enabled Stavrogin to save himself:

"The very acuteness of Stavrogin's self-awareness, reflected in his
penchant for analyzing his motives in his Confession, stands in the
way of a genuine repentance" (Friedman 1970, p. 179).
Although Stavrogin has a profound effect on the other characters
in the novel, he remains totally untouched by them:

"Stavrogin is the

source of the chaos that streams through the characters; he possesses
them but is not himself possessed" (Howe 1962, p. 62).
Disordered Will.

Friedman, in his discussion of Stavrogin's

intense self-consciousness, mentions the fact that Stavrogin's unwill
ingness to prevent what is happening to him even though he is conscious
of what is transpiring "may cause us to suspect that his perfect mas
tery of his will is an illusion" (Friedman 1970, p. 223).

Stavrogin,

according to Friedman, makes the mistake of "equating consciousness and
will and of thinking that because he knows what is happening, he is
free to stop it" (Friedman 1970, p. 223).

The will is more than merely

consciousness; it is, as Schrag and Peterson have pointed out, the agent
of decision and commitment.
One of the salient characteristics of will is, as Schrag has
pointed out, "irremediable finitude" (Schrag 1969, p. 102).

A healthy

will is one which acknowledges its inability to actualize any and all
courses of action.

In the case of Stavrogin, however, one is dealing

with a will, which refuses to acknowledge the existence of limitations.
Like the Underground Man, "He is obsessed by the pursuit of the
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impossible, which for him means freedom.

He rants against every sup

posed obstacle to the. satisfaction of his will" (Clive 1960, p. 113).
Howe makes the same point when he states:

. . the awareness of

human limits which Dostoevsky regards as essential to human life he
(Stavrogin) entirely lacks" (Howe 1962, p. 62).

The refusal to acknov-

edge the existence of limitations prevents Stavrogin from behaving in
a constructive and moral manner:
The first two impulses (passion for martyrdom and craving
for remorse) in Stavrogin, genuinely m.cral, are always
crippled and distorted by the third (moral sensuality)
which stems from his enjoyment of the outrageously per
verse, shocking, and sheerly gratuitous manifestations of
his absolute self-will (Frank 1969, p. 677).
For example, in the novel there is a duel scene where Stavrogin, in a
genuine attempt to avoid needless bloodshed, fires his pistol into the
air.

However, he does so in such an arrogant way that he only increases

his opponent's anger:
Here Stavrogin is attempting to achieve self-mastery and
to avoid useless bloodshed; but his manner is so arrogant
and contemptuous that he only arouses tne uncontrollable
hatred of his opponent all the more (Frank 1969, p. 679).
Stavrogin's problem has to do with the fact that he can "never negate
his egotism entirely to the point of a total abandonment of reflexive
self-concern" (Frank 1969, p. 680).

Stavrogin can never entirely over

come, or triumph over, his egotism and self-will.

Even his Confession,

as Tikhon points out, is merely, "another and more extreme form of the
'moral sensuality' that has marked all his previous attempts at selfmastery" (Frank 1969, p. 685).

Tikhon, realizing that Stavrogin is

incapable of attaining a state of true humility on his own,
. . . urges Stavrogin to submit his will completely to the
secret control of a saintly staretz, and thus discipline

himself by a total surrender to another as the first step
along the path to the acceptance of Christ and the hope
of foregiveness (Frank 1969, p. 685).
Stavrogin, however, cannot bring himself to submit his will to another
and so ends up by rejecting Tikhon's advice.
himself to self-destruction.

In so doing, he condemns

Stavrogin proved himself to be an indi

vidual who was incapable of placing any constraints on the "absolute
autonomy of his self-will" (Frank 1969, p. 670).
In refusing to place limitations on his self-will, Stavrogin
ended up by destroying himself.

Paradoxically, in refusing to acknowl

edge limitations, Stavrogin ended up by reducing his will to the level
of total impotence.

Peace, in commenting on Stavrogin's suicide note,

stated that it revealed a will which "shorn of all else is revealed in
all Its impotence; it lacks direction" (Peace 1975, p. 209).

Cause of the Affliction
Kuhn, in his discussion of his ennui, states that it is "a con
dition that is the immediate consequence of the encounter with nothing
ness" (Kuhn 1976, p. 13).

This encounter with nothingness usually

entails the loss of faith in the existence of God.
is cast into the void.
Dostoevsky.

Without God, man

This was a belief which was strongly held by

Dostoevsky, according to Clive, was characterized by a.

. . . sustained conviction that man's greatest problem every
where and any time is to be properly related to himself and
that this relationship can only be sound if ultimately
anchored in the presence of God (Clive 1960, d . 99).
De Jonge stresses the centrality, insofar as Dostoevsky's work is con
cerned, of the them of the "living life":
He (Dostoevsky) uses the term to describe a particular kind
of exultant joy at God's creation:
it is close to Christ's
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"the waters of life," and has the sense of an immediate expe
rience of the sheer plenitude of existence. . . . To attain
the living life is the ultimate Dostoevskian experience: to
taste paradise on earth (de Jonge 1975, p. 218).
To be cut off from God is to be cut off from the living life.

Enjoyment

of life is inextricably bound up with a belief in the existence of God.
The critics are almost unanimous in attributing Stavrogin's
affliction to his loss of religious faith.

Reinhardt, for example,

states:
Raskolnikov, Stavrogin, Ivan Karamazov and most of the
other Dostoevskyan "heroes" suffer because they have
stifled in themselves the sentiment of the good (that is,
the sentiment of God): they are left alone with themselves
(Reinhardt 1969, p. 63).
In divorcing himself from the good, Stavrogin "loses something very pre
cious without which he cannot live a human life" (Reinhardt 1969, p. 43).
To renounce the good is tantamount to renouncing one’s humanity.

In

place of God, Stavrogin substitutes "the hybris of mere rebellious selfassertion" (Reinhardt 1969, p. 47).

This egotistic self-assertion,

according to Dostoevsky, leads eventually to the destruction of the
individual.

In order to survive, it is essential that the individual

give himself over to a form of Christianity which combines in itself
"freedom and universal love" (Reinhardt 1969, p. 47).

For love,

Stavrogin substitutes a diabolical pride, a pride grounded in the
drive for "absolute self-assertion" (Reinhardt 1969, p. 51).

This

pride prevents him from accepting God and, in so doing, paves the
way for his eventual suicide.

Reinhardt summarizes Stavrogin's

plight in the following manner:
The psychological and theological implications of the dis
integration of Stavrogin's character point to the descrip
tive analyses presented in Kierkegaard’s most gloomy work,
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The Concept of Dread. Here the author depicts . . . the
progressive forlorness of the human person in the advanc
ing dread of nothingness and the concomitmant or subse
quent emergence of the demoniac forces. In the end there
remains nothing positive at all. Everything disinte
grates under the impact of the powers of evil, the work
of the "possessed," the work of those "devils" who carry
out the designs of their master Stavrogin. The daemonic
world circles about nothingness, meaninglessness and
despairing emptiness (Reinhardt 1969, p. 73).
Stavrogin, throughout the course of the novel, is attempting to discover
an appropriate channel for his enormous potential.

What he fails to

realize is that in denying the existence of God he is transforming the
world into a sterile desert devoid of meaning:
ents are useless.

a place where all tal

What Stavrogin fails to realize is that egotistic

self-assertion in a moral vacuum is little, more than an exercise in
total futility.

This is the point that Reinhardt makes in his analysis.

Harper attributes Stavrogin*s affliction to the unhappiness
caused by "the awareness of the vacuum left in (him) by the departure
of the old gods, too unhappy to go on living" (Harper 1967, p. 54).

In

turning from God, Stavrogin is turning from morality because Dostoevsky
linked "the destruction of God with the destruction of morality"
(Harper 1967, p. 64).

This world devoid of morality gives rise, as

Howe points out, to a "torpor of the spii^c." (Howe 1962, p. 62) which
cripples Stavrogin's will and prevents him from exercising his freedom
in a constructive manner.

Stavrogin looks upon the world as a void

and this perception gives rise to a total lack of desire.
becomes transformed into a empty husk.

Stavrogin

As Guerard states:

. . . he (Stavrogin) does not as a rule seem to be present
. . . in the present time of the novel. . . . Ideologi
cally . .
he is scarcely present as he listens passively
or ironically and with irritation to his doctrines of two
years ago (Guerard 1976, p. 285).

Peace attributes Stavrogin's lack of direction to "the absence of any
ethical code" (Peace 1975, p. 209).
is uncommitted'

He is neither good nor evil; "he

(Peace 1975, p. 209).

Stavrogin lacks direction because

he has denied God and in so doing denied the possibility of meaningful
action.

Peace sums it up when he states:

"Stavrogin's moral neutral

ity is in essence a religious problem" (Peace 1975, p. 214).

Stavrogin's

tragedy resides in the fact that "in him boundless potential has become
the importence of an existence without aim” (Peace 1975, p. 217).
Frank differs from the other critics in that he traces
Stavrogin’s inability to believe back to the pernicious influence
of the tutor Stephan on the young Stavrogin:
The tutor communicated all the moral uncertainty and insta
bility of bis own character to his unfortunate pupil with
out providing anything positive to counteract their unset
tling effects; the result was to leave an aching emptiness
at the center of Stavrogin's being (Frank 1969, p. 668).
This aching emptiness gives rise to a sacred longing which becomes an
obsession.

Stavrogin becomes engaged in a quest for an absolute.

How

ever, his quest is doomed to failure because, as Frank points out:
"His quest is a spiritual experimentation totally preoccupied with
itself, totally enclosed within the ego, and hence incapable of self
surrender to the absolute that it is presumably seeking" (Frank 1969,
p. 669).

Stephan's influence, while giving rise to a desire for a

spiritual absolute, at one and the same time dooms such a quest to
failure because it has implanted a sense of insecurity in Stavrogin
which is so strong that it prevents him from being able to move out
of himself.

Trapped within the confines of self, it becomes impos

sible for Stavrogin to find salvation.

The critics are almost

unanimous in attributing 3tavrogin‘s affliction to his loss of religious
faith.

Reinhardt, for example, states:

Raskolnikov, Stavrogin, Ivan Karamazov and most of the
other bostoevakyan "heroes" suffer because they have stifled
in themselves the sentiment of the good (that is, the senti
ment of God): they are left alone with themselves (Reinhardt
1969, p. 43).
In divorcing himself from the good, Stavrogin "loses something very pre
cious without which he cannot live a human life" (Reinhardt 1969, p. A3).
To renounce the good ie tantamount to renouncing one's numanity.

In

place of God, Stavrogin substituted "the hybris of mere rebellious selfassertion" (Reinhardt 1969, p. 47).

This egotistic self-assertion would,

according to Dostoevsky, lead eventually to the destruction of the indi
vidual.

In order to survive, it is essential that the individual give

himself over to a form of Christianity which would combine in itself
"freedom and universal love" (Reinhardt 1969, p. 47).

Stavrogin's dia

bolical pride, a pride grounded in the drive for "absolute selfassertion" (Reinhardt 1969, p. 51), prevents him from accepting God
and, in so doing, paves the way for his eventual suicide.
Harper, like Reinhardt, attributes Stavrogin’s affliction to the
unhappiness caused by "the awareness of the vacuum left in (him) by the
departure of the old gods, too unhappy to go on living" (Harper 1967,
p. 54).

Stavrogin has never known God.
Friedman differs from the other critics discussed to date in

that he views Stavrogin as an incredibly complex character who tran
scends analysis.

While acknowledging the fact that Stavrogin’s afflic

tion represents, in large part, a response to a lack of faith in God,
he, at one and the same time, states that any and all analyses of

44

Stavrogin’s behavior are, by definition, partial and incomplete.
Stavrogln defies such categorization.
. . . there is always more to Stavrogin than the psychologi
cal categories that he himself offers us. Dostoievsky has
created in Stavrogin a truly independent character who has
the right to give us his own conclusions about himself and
to demand of us that we meet him as a person— an existen
tial subject— and not just the object of his or our analy
ses (Friedman 1970, p. 224).

Summary
The critics are in essential agreement in regard to the nature
of the affliction from which Stavrogin is suffering.

The salient char

acteristics of the affliction are:
a) boredom

d) acute self-consciousness

b) divided personality

e) disordered will

c) isolation from others
The various symptoms are in a constant state of interaction.

For exam

ple, as Friedman points out, "The secret of Stavrogin's boredom and his
passionless indifference lies, more than anything, in the fact that he
is not only cut off and detached but irreparably divided" (Friedman
1970, p. 174).

Boredom, isolation, disordered will, division, and iso

lation are symptoms which are inextricably intertwined in a whole which
results from, according to the critics, a loss of faith.

The only

critic who is not totally in agreement with this analysis is Friedman.
According to Friedman, human behavior does not lend itself to complete
analysis.

Although it is possible to analyze a character's behavior,

such analyses are bound to be incomplete.

The Will and the Learning Process
"The concept of will has undergone a tortuous development in
the history of philosophy" (Schrag 1969, p. 99).
One of the basic problems confronting anyone who wishes to
investigate the nature of the will has to do with the fact that "there
is no other capacity of the mind whose very existence has been so con
sistently doubted and refuted by so eminent a series of philosophers"
(Arendt 1978, p. 4).

Arendt attributed this negative attitude towards

the will on the part of philosophers to the existence of a basic con
flict between "the experiences of thinking ego and those of the willing
ego” (Arendt 1978, p. 5).
lem of freedom:

"...

This basic conflict revolves around the prob
what aroused the philosophers’ distrust of this

faculty (will) was its inevitable connection with freedom:

’If I must

necessarily will, why need I speak of will at all?' as Augustine put
it. . . ."(Arendt 1978, p. 5).

Willing is inextricably associated with

freedom which, as Schrag points out, "needs to be understood in the
light of . . . finitude and ambiguity" (Schrag 1969, p. 102).

Freedom

is an extremely difficult term to come to terms with largely because of
the fact that, in regard to human conduct, it is extremely difficult to
determine where freedom ends and determinism begins.

In other words,

freedom is a concept whose parameters are continually shifting.
Schrag puts it:

As

"in freedom the contribution of initiation (originat

ing the action) and facticity (prior action upon one) remain ambigu
ously intertwined" (Schrag 1969, p. 102).

This fact has caused pro

fessional philosophers to regard the concept of will as a "curse"
(Arendt 1978, p. 5) which they would rather not deal with.
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The ambiguity surrounding the relationship between will and free
dom might account for the fact that will is a relatively recent concept.
It was unknown, to the Greeks and, according to Arendt, was not "dis
covered" until the beginning of the Christian era.
There is an additional problem which might have caused philos
ophers to shy away from the concept of will.

This has to do with the

fact that will concerns itself with the future.
. . . (will) deals not merely with thixxgs that are absent
from the senses and need to be made present through the
mind's power of re-presentation, but with things, visibles
and invisibles, that have never existed at all (Arendt 1973,
pp. 14-15.
The future is, by definition, uncertain.

It is extremely difficult to

predict, with any c. gree of certainty, what will happen.

As Arendt

points out, ". . . the future’s main characteristic is its basic uncer
tainty, no matter how high a degree of probability prediction may
attain" (Arendt 1978, p. 15).

The will is continually projecting

itself into a future whose salient characteristic is uncertainty.
In order to fully understand the will, it is necessary to util
ize an approach which is capable of coming to terms with the concept of
freedom as well as with the fact that when one is discussing the will
one is discussing a future fraught with uncertainty.

The existentialist

approach is best suited for this purpose because:
1.

Existential phixosophy is a philosophy of freedom.

"The

existentialist believes in himself, not as a thing but as a selfdetermining being.

Things determine each other.

He believes he pos

sesses the freedom of will; . . ." (Peterson 1970, p. 15).

Seetharamu,

in his discussion of the educational implications of existentialism,
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makes the same point:

"...

existentialists prefer to view man as an

infinitely free, responsible being.

According to Sartre freedom is

identical with existence" (Seetharamu 1978, p. 83).
2.

According to the existentialists, mar. creates himself

through his acts or projects, the outcomes of which are always uncer
tain.

The world in which man lives, according to the existentialists,

is, by definition, an uncertain, or unpredictable, one: '"Certainty,’
to the existentialist, is an entirely relative experience. . . . Because
each new decision will involve a new set of circumstances, no event,
law, or standard can be 'certain’" (Barnes 1968, p. 211).

The only cer

tainty the existentialist will acknowledge is that as a human being he
is free to choose or not to choose.
Existentialism’s ability to cope with the concept of freedom as
well as with the uncertainty inherent in human existence make it the
ideal theoretical framework with which to examine the workings of the
human will.

The function of such an approach is to:

. . . relocate volition in the stream of tenporalized and
spatialized experience and to study its development and
advance. To describe, analyze, and interpret the phe
nomenon of willing in its lived concreteness and existen
tial development . . . is the task which confronts the. phenomenologist of the will (Schrag 1969, p. 100).
The function of an existential approach is to show that the will is more
than a mere abstraction; it is an integral aspect of personality which
determines the ways in which the individual interacts with his environ
ment .
At this juncture, it is necessary to point out that any analysis
of will is bound to be, by definition, incomplete.

Since man is not God

he cannot totally comprehend all facets of his behavior.

His knowledge

of self is bound to be incomplete.
In focusing on the phenomenon of willing one finds that the
wealth of proliferating meanings is so vast that total com
prehension can at best be a regulative ideal. The finitude
of world experience affords no privileged standpoint . . .
from which a God-like survey might be conducted (Schrag
1969, p. 100).
The definition of wi?” - uich forms the theoretical underpinning
of this study has been extracted from the work of Schrag and Peterson.
Both utilize an existential approach in their examination of the will,
an approach which, as has been pointed out, is best suited to coping
with the ambiguity inherent in the concept of will.

Both theorists

focus in on the will in its "lived concreteness and existential deploy
ment" (Schrag 1969, p. 100).

Peterson is especially concerned with the

way in which the will is inextricably intertwined with the learning
process.

He focuses in on the will as an active agent which is con

tinually involved with the external world.

The will, from his point of

view, is not a riefied faculty but rather a phenomenon which plays an
active and crucial part "in the stream of temporalized and spatialized
experience" (Schrag 1969, p. 100).
While it is true that othe* theorists have dealt with the topic
of will and provided the reader with valuable insights into its work
ings, none have dealt with it in the systematic manner in which Schrag
and Peterson have.

Nietzsche, for example, made an invaluable contribu

tion to the study of the will in that he:

"...

centralize(d) the

notion of the wil].......Nietzsche was able to understand will as the
movement of self-affirmation in life, particularly as life comes to
grips with its existence problem” (Schrag 1969, p. 103).

Nietzsche

acknowledged the fact that the will was the prime agency of direction
and commitment.

He xvent astray, however, when he decided to "absolu

tize the will and to confer upon it a metaphysical supremacy" (Schrag
1969, pp. 103-104).

Nietzsche failed to realize that the will's abil

ity to execute a course of action was finite and conditioned.
Two other theorists who have examined the problem of will, are
Farber and May.

Farber's definition of will is somewhat similar to

that of Schrag and Peterson:

. . will is the category through which

we examine that portion of our life that is the mover of our life in a
certain direction or toward an objective in time" (Farber 1966, p. 7).
However, even though Farber, like Peterson and Schrag, looks upon will
as "responsible mover" (Farber 1966, p. 31), he fails to treat the sub
ject in a very systematic fashion.

However, there is one point which

he makes in his discussion which is of crucial importance insofar as
an understanding of the will is concerned.

In discussing previous

attempts to come to terms with the concept, he mentions the fact that
the scholarship on the will has been either self-serving or so incred
ibly abstract that it is difficult "for the reader to know that the
will had any relevance to human considerations" (Farber 1966, p. 29).
This, as Farber points out, has caused the subject of will "to lose
its connection with existence itself" (Farber 1966, p. 29).
area in which will played a pivotal role was literature.

The only

This was

attributable to the fact that literature "has always been interested
in man as a creature with seme capacity, even if only potential, for
independent personal volition" (Farber 1966, p. 30).
fact:

"...

Becaue . of this

the subject of will— explicitly and literally— has

engaged the interest of authors as diverse as Flaubert, Butler,
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Goncharov, Tolstoy, Dostoevsky, . .

(Farber 1966, p. 30).

Therefore,

in order for us to gain insights into the will it is necessary for the
reader to turn to literature.
The refusal on the part of thinkers, whether in the area of
philosophy or psychology, to tackle the problem of will has given rise
to certain problems, the most important of which being the tendency on
the part of thinkers to smuggle the concept of will into their discus
sions under another name, "this contraband will being usually an irre
sponsible mover of our lives" (Farber 1966, p. 30).

When some other

faculty, or agency, is called upon to become will "the existential or
phenomenological relevance of these aspects is diminished" (Farber
1966, p. 30).

Freud, for example, posited sexuality as the prime

mover of our existence.

In so doing, he presented us with a distorted

picture of human sexuality:

"...

when Freud insisted that sexuality

be Che will of his system, it was his and ultimately our understanding
of the place of sexuality in existence that suffered . . . "
1966, p. 30).

(Farber

Sexuality is merely one of many categories that have been

made to do the work of will in various psychological theories.
these categories are:

Some of

"unconscious, agression, dependence, power,

inferiority, sadomasochism, guilt, and, of course, anxiety" (Farber
1966, p. 31).
What holds true for psychological theories is equally applicable
to educational theories.

One of the categories educators frequently

make use of is "motivation."

They attempt to make this concept do the

work of will even though the resemblance between^ the two is, at best,
superficial.
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Motive and will have some superficial resemblance in that
they both provoke movement or action. If I disparage my
friend's achievements out of envy', envy is the motive of
my disparagement. However, envy is not the same as will,
even though my will to disparage may be incited by my
motive of envy. In other words a motive cannot be respon
sible for an action of will, even though it may provoke or
prompt such action. This has been the usual distinction
between will and motive. . . . It is when motive is used
as a cause that it begins to usurp the will's domain and
at the same time defeat the phenomenological venture. If,
out of envy, I will to disparage, I still have the option
of willing not to disparage (Farber 1966, pp. 30-31).
Hill, in his study of educational thought, while acknowledging
the fact that educators have a tendency tc use motivation in place, of
will, seems to imply that this is merely a matter of "jargonese" and
therefore unimportant:

"Learning involves the arcusai of the emotions

and the wooing of the will (the technical jargon for it is 'motivation')
as well as the extension of the mind" (Hill 1973).

What Hill fails to

realize is that: in substituting motivation for will educators are pre
cluding the possibility of choice on the part of the individual.

To

place motivation at the heart of education is to, knowingly or unknow
ingly, subscribe to a deterministic concept of man.

Man is reduced to

the level of an organism who responds to external stimuli! in a predict
able and rigid manner.

Man reacts because there is a "reason" or

"motive" for so doing.

The possibility of not responding is rot even

considered.

This is the point Farber made m

and motive.

Will and freedom are inextricably intertwined.

and freedom arc not.

his discussion of will
Motive

One cannot, therefore, equate motive with will.

In failing to come to terms with the concept of will, educators
almost invariably end up by putting forth theories of education which
lack a central focus.

An example of such a lack of focusing is

Berman's New Priorities in the Curriculum.
tivity, for example, she states:

In her discussion of crea

"In an interrelated manner, the indi

vidual’s cognitive skills, his emotions, his moral insights, and his
physical being are brought to bear upon a significant creative act"
(Berman 1968, p. 139).

This passage is confusing due to the fact that

Berman fails to address herself to a crude 1 question:

What aspect of

the self brings together these disparate elements in such a way that a
creative act comes into being?
(Farber 1966, p. 30).

What is lacking is a "prime mover"

It is this prime mover which, as Schrag pointed

out, binds the self "to its project" (Schrag 1969, p. 107).
Farber and Schrag refer to this prime mover as "will."

Both

In failing to

take into consideration the part played by will, Berman is presenting
us with a disjointed and extremely nebulous concept of man:
The search by this author for a view of man led to a descrip
tion of him as a process-oriented being. Process orientation,
as used in this book, means that a person has within his per
sonality elements of dynamism, motion, and responsibility
which enable him to live as an adequate and a contributing
member of the world of which he is part (Berman 1968, p. 9).
In this passage, as in the one quoted above, Berman fails to specify
what bring ■ together the elements of "dynamism, motion, and respon
sibility."

She presents the reader with a list of characteristics,

asserts that these characteristics interact In a meaningful way, but
ends up by failing to specify exactly what it is that is responsible
for this meaningful interaction.

Her analysis of human behavior is,

at best, partial.
May is another theorist who has written about the will.
defines will in the following manner:

"Will is the capacity to

organize one's self so that movement in a certain direction or
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toward a certain goal may take place" (May 1969, p. 218).

As was the

case with Farber, May, while putting forward a definition of will which
agrees, for the most part, with that provided by Schrag and Peterson,
fails to treat the will in a systematic and thorough fashion.
May does, however, make one point which is worthy of consider
ation.

Like Farber, May believes that the period in which we are liv

ing should be called "the age of the disordered will" (Quoted in May
1969, p. 27).

Underlying this disordered will, according to May, is:

"» . . a state of feelinglessness, the despairing possibility that
nothing matters, a condition very close to apathy" (May 1969, p. 27).
Will implies commitment and movement— a reaching out to the future.
Apathy, on the other hand, entails "the withdrawal of will and love,
a statement that they 'don't matter,' a suspension of commitment"
(May 1969, p. 33).

According to May there is an extremely close

connection between apathy and violence:
There is a dialectical relationship between apathy and
violence. To live in apathy provokes violence and . . .
violence promotes apathy. Violence is the ultimate destruc
tive substitute which surges in to fill the vacuum where
there is no relatedness. . . When inward life dries up,
when feeling decreases and apathy increases, when one can
not affect or even genuinely touch another person, violence
flares up as a daimonic necessity for contact, a mad drive
forcing touch in the most direct way possible (May 1969,
pp. 30-31).
May's theory concerning the relationship between apathy, violence, and
the. disordered will is helpful insofar as an understanding of Stavrogin
is concerned, particularly in regard to his relationship to the young
girl (Matryosha).

Violence (Stavrogin’s violation of the young child)

is followed by apathy (Stavrogin not acting even though he is aware of
the fact that next door the young girl, is in the process of commiting

suicide).

From May's point of view; Stavrogin would be a prime example

of a disordered will.
The salient characteristics of that which is referred to as the
learning process have, for the most part, been extracted from the work
of Peterson.

It is Peterson who states that "it is the will which con

tinually insists upon the mind being actively involved in the learning
process" (Peterson 1977b, p. 16).

He goes on to say that the basic

underlying assumption of the learning process is that "man lives,
moves and i,„s being on some plane of judgment" (Peterson 1970, p. 22).
Man is c m: al creature who must continually make choices which will
determine who he is.

The function of the learning process is to bring

the individual to that point where he will be able, and willing, not
merely to act, but to assume responsibility for his actions.

Wynne,

in his introduction to Peterson's study of the relationship between
existentialism and education states that the philosophy underlying the
learning process:
. . . is one that will recognize the person, one that will
support this person in his efforts for self-development,
one that will provide necessary resources, one that will
not stifle emerging qualities and one. that will be accept
ing of the total product developed (Wynne 1970, p. vii).
As pointed out earlier, learning takes p]ace when individuals freely
enter a state of relationship in order to explore ideas.

Such explora

tion reveals the connections which exist between various ideas and the
be.aring these connections have on the lives of the learners.

Learning

entails commitment and, as pointed out in the Definition of Terms sec
tion, commitment is an act of will.

Summary
The portrait of Stavrogin which emerges from an examination of
the critical commentary is of an "irreparably divided individual whose
unearthly beauty is the facade behind which festers th<> horror of evil
and corruption" (Frank 1969, p. 670),

His is an essentially empty exis

tence, the salient characteristic of which is a self-destructive bore
dom which is so extreme that it periodically gives rise to acts of
extreme violence.

He is an extremely isolated individual who is able

to touch others only through the infliction of pain.

Frank attributes

Stavrogin's inner emptiness to the disastrous relationship which existed
between the young Stavrogin and his teacher Stephan.
In regards to the concept of will, the most outstanding feature
of this concept is the lack of knowledge we possess concerning its work
ings.

As Arendt and Farber pointed out, the concept has either been

tota-ly ignored or else handled in such a way that it no longer retains
any human characteristics.

This is attributable in large part to the

fact that when discussing will one must, of necessity, also discuss
freedom— a concept whose ambiguity most philosophers find extremely
threatening.

In order to fully comprehend its true nature it is neces

sary to utilize an existential framework because existentialism is,
above all else, a philosophy of freedom.

As such, it is best suited

to deal with the; ambiguity which is an inherent part of any discussion
concerning the will.

Both Schrag and Peterson, the two theorists from

whose work the definition of will being utilized in this study has been
extracted, utilize such an approach.

While Farber and May do, upon

occasion, provide us with insights into the x^orkings of the will, the

fact remains that their discussions are not as thorough and comprehen
sive as Peterson's and Schrag's.

May does provide us with one extremely

important insight into Stavrogin's behavior.

As he points out, there is

a definite relationship between apathy, violence and the disordered will.
This observation is especially applicable to Stavrogin’s case.

As most

of the critics who have discussed Stavrogin have pointed out, he is an
individual characterized by an extreme apathy which gives rise to occa
sional bouts of violence.

His is a disordered will.

CHAPTER III

DOSTOEVSKY AS EPISTEMOLOGIST

In the introduction to this study it was stated that epistemol
ogy refers to that:

"...

branch of philosophy which investigates the

origin, structure, method and validity of knowledge" (Wood 1960, p. 94).
It is the contention of this study that Dostoevsky should be recognized
as an epistemologist even though he never wrote a treatise in which he
outlined, in a systematic manner, his theory of knowledge.
an epistemologist in the academic sense of the world.

He was not

Rather, he was

a writer who presented the reader with a variety of fictional charac
ters who embodied his most pressing concerns.

He was one of ti ose

Russian writers whom Clive refers to as intuitive existentialists,
i.e., writers who created "a gallery of characters who embody existen
tial themes and insights not only by virtue of the way they think but
also through their actions" (Clive 1972, pp, xiii-xiv).

These partic

ular writers utilized the approach that they did because they firmly
believed that in examining the development of a character, or charac
ters, who embodied those themes which most concerned them they were
presenting the reader with studies whose vividness was far more per
suasive than any discursive argumentation.
Thus, emphasis is being placed on Dostoevsky's The Possessed
because it is the novel in which he, through his study of Stavrogin,
articulates his views concerning the nature of the learning process.

This is of particular importance because, as Peterson has pointed out,
in examining an individual's views concerning the learning process what
one is actually doing is examining that individual's philosophy of man:
"Philosophy is more than a scientific discipline or one of the arts of
learning.

It is the learning process" (Peterson 1970, p. 22).

In examining the student-teacher relationship as manifested in
the relationship between Stavrogin and. Stephan, what is being examined
is the nature of man and the way in which man interacts with others.
For this reason, The Possessed can be looked upon as the summation of
Doscoevsky's ideas concerning the nature of man.
The major concepts which will be utilized in this section were
defined in the Definition of Terms section.

In this particular section

these concepts will be shown in context, i.e., as ideas which have an
impact on human beings.

Dostoevsky firmly believed that in order tc

understand a concept it was necessary to understand the way in which
it influenced men.
In a letter written to his brother Michael (October 31, 1838),
the young Dostoevsky addressed himself to the problem of "knowledge":
What do you mean precisely by the word know? Nature,
the soul, love, and God, one recognizes through the heart,
anu not through reason. Were we spirits, we could dwell
in that region of ideas over which our souls hover, seek
ing the solution. But we are earthborn beings, and can
only guess at the Idea— not grasp it by all sides at once.
The guide for our intelligences through the temporary illu
sion into the innermost center of the soul is called Reason,
Now, Reason is a material capacity while the soul or spirit
lives on the thoughts whispered by the heart. Thought is
born in the soul
Reason is a tool, a machine, which is
driven by the spiritual fire. When human reason penetrates
into the domain of knowledge, it works independently of the
feeling, and consequently of the heart , But: when our aim
is the understanding of love or of nature, we march towards
the very citadel of the heart. . . . Philosophy cannot be
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regarded as a mere equation where nature is the unknown quan
tity. Remark that the poet, in the moment of inspiration,
comprehends God, and consequently does the philosopher's work.
Consequently poetic inspiration is nothing less than philosoph
ical inspiration. Consequently philosophy is nothing but
poetry, a higher degree of poetry (Dostoevsky 1961, pp. 6-7).
The main tenets of Dostoevsky’s argument, as put forward in the
letter just quoted, are as follows:
1.

As Zbilut, in his study of Dostoevsky’s philosophical con

cerns; states:

”, . . the real world is composed of ideations, i.e.,

nature, the soul, love and God" (Zbilut 1S73, p. 42).
2.

The real world is known through the heart, as opposed to

reason.
Man is a limited creature.

He is "earth-born."

Because of

this fact he must resort to reason in order to elucidate those truths
which are accessible only to heart.
4.

However, because man does not have direct knowledge of the

truths of heart and can gain only a parL^-x knowledge of them through
the use of reason, he can only "guess at the idea."
5.

In summary, what truths man does possess are uncovered only

when the heart and reason interact in that act referred to as the
"guess."

Trouble occurs when the heart and reason, or the affective

and the cognitive, are unable to function together in such a way as ".o
"guess at the ?dea."
Reality relers to the world of the existing, i.e., to a world
inhabited by others-as-subjects as well as, from a Christian existential
point of view, God or Ultimate Reality.

God constitutes Ultimate Reality

because He is the Being from whom all other beings originate.

According

to Zbilut, man is continually attempting to "guess" at the nature of
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this Ultimate Reality.

Man is continually attempting to establish con

tact with God because it is only after this contact has been established
that man will become a united whole.

In order to better understand the

nature of this quest, it is necessary to understand the meaning of a
pivotal concept, i.e., presence.
Presence refers to "the mode of existing that is personal*'
(O'Malley 1966, p. 96).

This entails, in addition to the perception

of self as subject, the recognition of the other-as-subject.

The indi

vidual opens himself up and allows the other to enter into his time and
space.

Simultaneously, he enters into the space and time of the other.

Two individuals who are sharing of themselves in this way are involved
in a meeting of shared presence.

In so communing with another, one is

transcending the limitations of self and reaching out for God.

The

Christian existentialist is one who believes that the path to God must
be traversed via communion with others.
In order for the communion with other to occur, there mus.. exist
within Luc individual, a balance between the affective and the cognitive
Such a balance enables the individual to perceive and experience the
other-as-subject . Where such a balance is lacking, no communion occurs
and the iniividual personality becomes distorted.

In those instances

where reason exists independently of the affective, what remains is

a

pervasive sterility which transforms the individual into little more
than an empty husk, i.e., Stavrogin or Goliadkin in The Double.

Indi

viduals, on the other hand, whose lives are characterized by a lack of
reason, are little more than impotent dreamers.

Individuals such as

these are unable to deal, in an adequate manner, with the world which
they inhabit.

The un-named hero of "White Nights" is a prime example
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of just such an impotent dreamer.
However, even in those instances where the affectivr and the
cognitive are in balance, it is extremely difficult, if not impossible,
for man to achieve perfect communion with God.

According to Dostoevsky,

this is attributable to the fact that man is, by definition, an imper
fect creature.

He pointed out in the letter to his brother Michael

which was quoted earlier:

"But we are earthborn beings, and can only

guess at the Idea (God--G. Toews)-not grasp it by all sides at once"
(Dostoevsky 1961, pp. 6-7).

Zbilut expands on this idea in his discus

sion of Dostoevsky’s ontology:
. . . the ontological reality of Dostoevsky's "self," his
"I," revealed to him the possibility of extending itself
to become a different, a better "I" growing out of man’s
ability to be spontaneous and different. This better "I.”
would root itself in the unity of all humanity, and worked
for teleogic&iiy with the assumption that death and an
afterlife were necessary phases of this teleology. To
expect such a unity "here and now" was an impossibility
for Dostoevsky, and totally contrary to what he had come
to understand regarding man's nature (Zbilut 1973, p. 73).
Before proceeding further, it is necessary to point out that "teleology"
refers to a "theory of purpose, ends, goals, final causes, values, the
Good(s)" (Long 1960, p. 315).
present in terms of the future.

Teleology explains the past and the
In Dostoevsky's case, the future which

gives meaning to all else is man's ultimate coming together with God— a
union x^hich will occur after man's death.

God is the Good.

It is impossible for man to unite with God in the "here and now"
because of the fact that his egoism prevents him from being able to
abandon, or transcend, himself to the point where such a union could
take place.
God.

The best man can hope for is the occasional glimpse of

Such a glimpse, or experience, of God occurs to Alesha in
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The Brothers Karamazov:
Alesha stood, looked, and suddenly, as though his legs were
cut from under him, threw himself on the earth.
He did not know why he embraced it, he did not try to
account for the fact that he so irresistably felt like kiss
ing it, kissing the whole1
, of it. But he kissed the earth
weeping, sobbing, covering it with his tears, and in
ecstacy he swore to love it, to love it for all eternity.
. . . It was as though threads from all these countless
worlds of God had come together all at once in his soul,
and his soul trembled in contact with other worlds . . .
with every moment he feels clearly, almost tangibly, that
something firm and unshakeable, like the heavenly dome
above him, was entering his soul . . . "something visited
my soul at that moment," he said later with firm belief in
his words (Quoted in Peace 1975, p. 289).
Such an experience falls under the heading of "numinous," a
state of being during which the individual feels as though he has
come into contact with something divine.

It is a transcendent expe

rience in that it enables the individual to perceive those "threads"
which tie everything together.
Such an experience is denied to an individual such as Stavrogin,
an egoist of enormous proportions.

As Holquist pointed out:

. . . throughout the novel he (Stavrogin) is character
ized by the most intense, striving, a quest that has as
its goal an absolute ego. VJhat. he desires is a kind of
parthenogenisis of self (Hclquist 1977, p. 139).
The seemingly irrational acts commited by Stavrogin, e.g., biting the
governor's ear, represent an attempt on his part to "astound, to per
form a deed that, will be so unexpected that it can have sprung only
from a self free of all constraints imposed by social expectations"
(Holquist 1: 77, p. 142).

Stavrogin is determined to prove that he is

a unique creature who is totally independent of others.

He fails to

realize that the self exists only in relationship to others— others
as subjects and not objects.

In denying the selfhood of others,

Stavrogin ends up by denying himself and God as well.
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In order to better understand Dostoevsky's ontology, it is
necessary to take into account the nature of the relationship which
exists between ontology and phenomenology:

"Phenomenology is concerned

. . . with the structure of consciousness, and ontology concerns the
sorts of beings that such structures must commit us to on the assump
tion that this analysis is true" (Danto 1975, p. 41).

Knowledge of the

structure of consciousness provides the reader with insight into the
nature of the being who possesses tnat particular consciousness.

An

analysis of consciousness, from an existential point of view, uncovers
two types of being which are essential to an understanding of Dostoevsky's
work:
1.

Being-for-itself— This type of being is characteristic of

beings "part of whose nature is that they are aware of themselves and
cannot exist as such without such awareness" (Danto 1975, pp. 41-42).
2.

Being-for-others— This type of being "depends upon something

other than itself, namely, upon those things other that itself of which
it is conscious" (Danto 1975, p. 42).

This type of being entails an

awareness that one cannot fully realize the implications inherent in
the fact that one is a choosing subjectivity until, and unless, one
becomes aware of the other as a choosing subjectivity.
The two kinds of being are frequently intertwined:

"I exist for myself

at the level of self-consciousness just and only just when I become aware
of existing for others" (Danto 1975, p. 115).
connected with consciousness of others.
of the other being conscious of me.

Consciousness of myself is

This would entail an awareness

In order for the individual to be

seriously aware of himself "as a subject presupposes an awareness of
others' awareness of me as an object" (Danto 1975, p. 115).

I become

a person only when I acknowledge the personhood of others.

In interacting

with others, the individual becomes aware of himself as a person, i.e., a
choosing subjectivity.
Being-for-itself, if not complemented by being-for-others, gives
rise to a diffuse and fragmented sense of self.

If an individual does

not exist for others, then he does not exist for himself.

To be con

scious only of oneself is tantamount to transforming oneself into an
object which one can never fully understand.

Objectification of self

is diametrically opposed to that type of consciousness in which one is
aware of oneself as a choosing subjectivity which is responsible for
its choices.

Objectification of self gives rise to a serious problem

having to do with the individual’s inability to know:

. . that what

I was aware of was myself, more intimately related to me than the other
objects which swim before awareness; this would be like a certain form
of schizophrenia" (Danto 1975, p. 55).

Schizoid states are character

ized by a split between the affective and the cognitive.

Such a split

gives rise to a disordered, or malfunctioning, will.
In Orirce and Punishment, Dostoevsky presented us with a portrait
of an individual, Raskolnikov, who is totally locked up within himself.
After having commited two murders, he is able to redeem himself but only
after he has acknowledged the existence of others.

It is his acceptance

of Sonia's compassion which enables Raskolnikov to save himself.

Through

out his writings, it is apparent that Dostoevsky firmly believed that man,
in order to save himself, must accept the fact that the Other is not
merely an object among otber objects.

He must recognize that the Other

is a choosing subjectivity in the same way that he is a choosing sub
jectivity.

Stavrogin is doomed because he attempts to create himself

in a vacuum, totally removed from the influence of others.

Because he

cannot accept the "reality" of others, he hurts those around him and
ends up by commiting suicide.
Quite early in his career, Dostoevsky came out in favor of a
unique brand of realism in which emphasis is placed on recognition of
the other-as-subject.

In responding to the other in such a way, the

individual is able to transcend himself.

The realism to which

Dostoevsky adhered represented a mode of thought in which emphasis
was placed upon "will" and "faith."

It constitutes a transcendence

of the subject.
Realism in this sense means a peculiar attitude of will,
. . . which . . . implies a particular sort of cognition.
In so far as the wlll-to-good is aware of its own exis
tence, it discovers in itself this essential power of
cognition: we call it Faith (Ivanov 1971, pp. 26-28).
The recognition of the other-as-subject entails an act of commitment on
the part of the will to the subjectivity of the other.

The will has

faith in the other, i.e., believes in the other-as-subject even though
such a belief cannot be empirically validated.
. . . faith is believing or not believing in something or
someone by an act of will inspired by personal experience,
and not by the intimidation of "objective" facts. . . . If
faith in God was to be accepted it could be done . . .
through an existential demonstration motivated by the nondiscursive reasoning of the "heart" (Zbilut 1973, p. 77).
"Heart," or the affective, is an active component of the self which
reaches out in search of knowledge.
know, by a "spiritual fire."

The knowledge it is seeking is of a kind

not normally associated with reason.
of God.

It is motivated by the desire to

It is searching after knowledge

It is "an active principle of acquiring knowledge in terms of

a desire or urge" (Zbilut 1973, p. 30).
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The question arises as to how the cognitive, the affective and
the will interact, insofar as Dostoevsky was concerned.

The following

passage from Sandoz’s book on Dostoevsky will help to clarify the exact
nature of this relationship:

"...

when man encounters 'ultimate real

ity* through an experience of transcendent being, the distinction between
the metaphysical and the religious may become meaningless" (Sandoz 1971,
p. 52).

In his letter to his brother, Dostoevsky made reference to "the

spiritual fire."

It is this spiritual fire which compels man toward

this experience of transcendent reality in which the distinction between
the metaphysical, or reason, and religious, or affective, disappears.
"Spiritual fire" is Dostoevsky's term for the will.
which commits the self to the ocher-as'-subj ect.

It is the will

In so doing, the will

is responsible for the individual moving outside of himself.
ment outward constitutes transcendence.

This move

In moving outside of himself,

the individual is able to perceive the relationship which exists between
all things.

In other words, it makes the individual aware of God because

God is the Being from whom all else originates.
harmony and order.

He is the source of

To perceive. God is to erase all boundaries and dis

tinctions and to become aware of the whole.
Ivanov made essentially the same point x^hen he stated that the
ultimate aim of realism was an "intuitive seeing through" (Ivanov 1971,
p. 26).

Intuition refers to an unmediated flash of wisdom, a perfect

moment when time stops and the pattern of the universe is revealed.
Ivanov stated that the act of will which was responsible for this
novel perspective on the xvorld was inextricably related to that which
he referred to as faith.

Faith constitutes a special kind of commit

ment which "is impervious to complete rational or logical justification"

(Edie 1963, p. 9).

It is an action whereby the will commits the self to

a belief in God, a belief which is inseparable from a belief in the other
as a choosing subjectivity.

Faith is, above all else, "a sign of the

good health of the will" (Ivanov 1971, p. 28).
At this juncture, it is necessary to point out the difference
which exists between religious "reality," a reality which entails a
belief in the existence of God and soul, and humanistic "reality," a
reality which entails a belief In, and love of, one’s fellow man.
gious knowledge is revealed knowledge.

Reli

The mind does not conceive, or

construct, this particular type of knowledge.
knowledge is delivered to man by the numinous:

This particular type of
"The religious elements

. . . are theoretically revealed by the numinous and, then, are either
accepted or rejected by man.

(After the acceptance of faith, the mind

. . . may help elucidate the revealed, religious truths) (Zbilut 1973,
p. 92).

Humanistic beliefs, on the other hand, are initially conceived

of by the mind as abstractions.

If these abstractions are accepted by

the self, they are transformed into behaviors.
Humanistic beliefs, as opposed to religious beliefs, are firmly
rooted in a rational base.

Initially, Dostoevsky equated the elucida

tion of religious beliefs with the elucidation of humanistic beliefs.
He failed to understand that in the one case (religious) elucidation
occurs after the beliefs have been accepted whereas in the other case
(humanistic) elucidation precedes acceptance.
It was not until the publication of The Brothers Karamazov
that Dostoevsky managed to clarify his thinking concerning religious
and humanistic beliefs.

Finally aware of the opposition between humanism and religion
with respect to reason, he (Dostoevsky) went on to show that
humanism, as well as religion, could not be given rational
justifications, since they were both ultimately matters of
choice by faith (Zbilut 197?- p. 73).
Dostoevsky arrived at the conclusion that reason was unable to endow the
individual’s life with meaning.
equated with objective belief.
(Olson 1962, p. 99).

For example, religious truth cannot be
Religious truth is ’’subjective passion"

What Olson is describing is the position taken by

the Christian existentialists.

It is also Dostoevsky’s position.

Dostoevsky’s position vis-a-vis religion and mankind is an existential
one,

Dostoevsky viewed man as a choosing subjectivity whose belief in

God was grounded in passion rather than reason.
It is important to note, at this juncture, that religious beliefs
are not necessarily diametrically opposed to humanistic ones.
of fact, the two beliefs are often inextricably intertwined.

In point
It is not

uncommon to find that a belief in the existence of a benevolent deity
leads to a belief in, and love of, one’s fellow men.
example, combined, in his person, the two beliefs.

Dostoevsky, for
Not only did he

believe in the existence of God, he also believed love of God was synonomous with love of man.

Both beliefs, as has been pointed out, can

not be justified rationally.

Both entail a leap to faith— a transcen

dence of the precepts of critical reason and empirical belief.

This is

not to say that reason has no part to play insofar as these beliefs are
concerned.

Reason is a tool which helps to elucidate the beliefs which

one has committed oneself to.

In addition, as has been pointed out,

humanistic beliefs are initially conceived of as abstractions.

How

ever, reason itself cannot bring about a commitment in these beliefs.
Commitment entails the introduction of the affective— the subjectivity

which transcends the boundaries of reason.
affective complement one another.

Ideally, the cognitive and

The combination of humanistic and

religious beliefs would be a prime example of such a complementary
relationship.

These two kinds of beliefs, whose origins differ in

ways which have already been pointed out, can interact in an effective
manner only if these two aspects of the individual (cognitive and
affective) work together.

When the two are opposed to one another,

or when one dominates at the expense of the other, tragedy results.
An example of such an imbalance is to be found in Dostoevsky's Notes
From Underground, a work in which the reader is confronted with an
individual who is unable to transform his intellectual insights into
existential realities.

Such an individual is unable to bridge the

gap which separates thought from action.
Existential thinkers have often been divided into two cate
gories:

(1) the religious oriented and, (2) the non-religious, or

atheistic.

Such a division is, to a large extent, an artificial one

which fails to take into account x«?hat the two categories have in
common:
. . . we should not emphasize the difference between reli
gious and non-religious existentialists to such an extent
that we ignore their common effort to move toward a prac
tice of presence that is open to all men who are not, as
Marcel puts it, "encumbered with themselves" and therefore
temporarily incapable of presence (Harper 1972, p. 115).
Presence, as has been pointed out, refers to an openness to reality as
manifested in the other-as-subject.

In addition, from a Christian

point of view, it involves an openness to God.
importance of openness.

Both groups stress the

An individual who is incapable of presence is

one who is totally wrapped up in himself and out of touch with others,

An individual who is characterized by presence is one who is open to
others and who behaves in a spontaneous and non-artificial manner.
Such an individual embraces the world with his entire being.

Tikhon,

during his discussion with Stavrogin, emphasized the similarities
which existed between the atheist and the believer.
", . . complete atheism is more respectable than worldly
indifference," Tikhon answered, with visible gaiety and good
nature.
"Oho, that’s how you get round it!”
"A complete atheist stands on the last rung but one
before absolute faith (he may or may not step higher), but
an indifferent man has no longer any faith at all, nothing
but an ugly fear, and that only on rare occasions, if he is
a sentimental man" (Dostoevsky 1972, p. 33).

Summary
Dostoevsky believed that true knowledge, i.e,, knowledge per
taining to the soul, God, and love, is a form of revealed truth which
is transmitted directly to the affective.

However, since man is, by

definition, a limited creature, he must resort to reason in order to
elucidate that which has been revealed to the affective.

Such elucida

tion occurs after the will has decided for, or against, those truths
which have been revealed to the affective.

An affirmative action on

the part of the will, i.e., acceptance of revealed truth, entails com
mitment not merely to God but to the other.

It is only through commit

ment to the other, a commitment grounded in love, that the individual
is able to strengthen those beliefs to which he has commited himself.
The main tenets of Dostoevsky’s philosophy can be summarized in the
following manner:
1.

God is the essence which precedes existence.

He is the

Ultimate Reality from which all else, including man, emanates.

No
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being can exist without Him Who Is.

Wherever He is not, there is a

void.
2.

Man is the only one of God’s creatures who is chare

ized by the burden of freedom.
or he can deny Him.

Man can either actively seek

The choice, is man's.

erGod,

In "The Legend of the Grand

Inquisitor" Section of The Brothers Karamazov, Dostoevsky a

irms the

inviolability of human freedom and the autonomy of the in. ..vidual per
son under God and attacks those, such as the Grand Inquisitor, who would
strip man of his freedom by making his choices for him
3.

The will, which is the agent of commitmer

, bases its deci

sion on information received via the affective and the cognitive.
affective, according to Dostoevsky, is somewhat r
cognitive.

This is attributable to the fact th

The

a important than the
religious truth is

revealed truth, i.e., nonmediated truth which is transmitted directly
to the affective, or "heart."
truth.

The will can accept or reject revealed

If it accepts it, the cognitive is activated in order to help

elucidate that which has been revealed.
A.

A belief in God is inextricably intertwined with a love of

one’s fellow man.

It is through acceptance of the other as subject

that one is able to move closer to God.

This is due to the fact that

relationships with others enables the individual to transcend, or move
outside of, himself.
5.

In so doing, he cornes closer to God.

Since man is, by definition, an imperfect creature, it is

impossible for him to establish a perfect union with God in the hereand-now.

This is attributable to the fact of man’s egoism which hin

ders, or prevents, him from being able to transcend himself to the
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extent that such a union would entail.

The best man can hope for is

the occasional glimpse of God, i.e., the occasional intuitive flash
of wisdom which enables the individual to discern the pattern of the
universe.
6.

Mar will be reunited with God in the afterlife.

CHAPTER IV

STAVROGIN

This chapter is divided into two sections, the first of which
details, in a chronological manner, the major events of Stavrogin's
life.

This overview lays the foundation for the analysis of Stavrogin's

life which is the focus of the second section of this chapter.

Overview of Stavrogin's Life
Up until the age of eight, Stavrogin has been brought up
entirely under his mother’s supervision.

His father, who displayed

little interest in the child, had moved out some time previously.
The relation that existed between the mother and child is described
in the following way:
Th boy knew that his mother was very fond of him, but he
was hardly very fond of her. She did not talk to him a
lot, rarely interfered with him, but somehow he was always
morbidly aware that she was watching him (Dostoevsky 1965,
p. 53).
At the age of eight Stavrogin became a pupil of Stephan Verkhovensky,
a somewhat pompous but well-intent foiled individual who had been sup
ported by Mrs. Stavrogin for some years.

Stephan was able to secure

Stavrogin's devotion because "he was a child himself" (Dostoevsky
1965, p. 53).
Insofar as Stephan was concerned, Stavrogin was more than
merely a pupil; he was, in addition, Stephan's friend.

He treated

Stavrogin as a friend and was continually confiding in him:
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He used often to wake his ten- or eleven-year-old friend at
night for the sole purpose of pouring out his wounded feel
ings to him, or to tell him some family secret, without
realizing that that was something he should not do. They
flung themselves into each other's arms and cried
(Dostoevsky 1965, p, 53).
The affect of this kind of relationship on the c lild was considerable
I think it is true to say that the teacher was responsible
for upsetting his pupil's nerves to some extent. Wien at
the age of sixteen Nicholas was taken to the lycee, he
looked sickly and pale and was strangely quiet and wist
ful. . . . One must also assume that if the two friends
had went and flung themselves into each other's arms, it
was not always because of some domestic misunderstandings.
Hr, Verkhovensky succeeded in touching some of the deep
est chords in his little friend's heart and in evoking
in him the first and still vague sensation of that eternal
and sacred longing which many chosen spirits, having once
tasted and experienced it, will never afterwards exchange
for some cheap feeling of satisfaction.
(There are even
such lovers of sensation to whom this longing is dearer
than the most: complete satisfaction, if such a thing were
at all possible.) Be that as it may, it was certainly a
good thing that the tutor end his pupil were at last
separated, though perhaps a little late (Dostoevsky 1965,
P- 54).
During those times when Stavrogin returned from the Ivcee in
Petersburg, usually during the holidays, he appeared to be somewhat
shy and retiring.

He maintained a certain distance between himself

ard Stephan, even though he appeared to retain a certain affection
for him.
Upon graduating from the lycee, he bowed to his mother's
wishes and applied for a commission in the army.

Within a rela

tively brief period of time he joined a calvary regiment of the
Horse Guards.

Mrs. Stavrogin lavished enormous sums of money on

her son in the hope that he would achieve the success in high
society that she had never been able to do.
dashed.

Her hopes were soon
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Word reached Mrs. Stavrogin that her son had given himself over
to a life of total dissipation.

He behaved towards others in a brutal

manner and was supposed to have been involved in a rather sordid affair
with a lady of good society whom, according to rumor, he publicly
insulted shortly after the affair had come to an end.

Shortly after

these rumors reached her, Mrs. Stavrogin learned that her son had
been involved in two duels and that he had killed one opponent and
maimed the other.
martialled.

As a result of these duels, Stavrogin was court-

He was reduced to the ranks and transferred to one of

the line regiments.
In 1863 he "somehow managed to distinguish himself" (Dostoevsky
1965, p. 55).

Within a relatively brief period of time, he had managed

to regain his commission.

Shortly thereafter, he returned to Peters‘ ft’ 5-

burg.

;

"■?’

It was some time before Mrs. Stavrogin learned what he was doing,

b vc eventually she discovered that he was living with the dregs of
Petersburg society.

What transpired during this period of time is not

described in the novel as originally published.

In order to find out

what happened to Stavrogin during this period of time, it is necessary
to refer to Stavrogin's Confession.

Due to censorship problems, this

section, which was Intended to appear after Chapter VIII of Part II,
did not appear in print until 1922.
The Confession section starts o f with Stavrogin going off to
see Tikhon, the holy man, in order to see whether or not he can rid
Stavrogin of the hallucinations to which he is subject.

These hallu

cinations take the form of a malicious being who is both mocking and
"rational" (Dostoevsky 1972, p. 28).

During the ensuing conversation,

Stavrogin reveals that he has brought something for Tikhon to read.
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Stavrogin states that he plans to circulate this document widely after
Tikhon has looked at it.
In this document, or confession, Stavrogin talks about his life
in Petersburg.

He starts off by stating that he was engaged in two

affairs simultaneously— one with a lady and the other with her maid.
He intended to amuse himself by having the two women meet each other
at his lodgings.

At this time, Stavrogin possessed tx.ro lodgings, one

of which was rented from a clerk and his wife.
young daughter by the name of Matryosha.

This couple had a

Due to the fact that both

parents worked, Stavrogin frequently found himself left alone with
the girl.
One day Stavrogin was unable to find on his table a penknife
"which I did not need in the least, and which lay there for no par
ticular reason" (Dostoevsky 3972, pp. 41-42).
lady of his loss.
daughter.

He informed the land

The landlady immediately proceeded to threash her

Just before this occurred, however, Stavrogin found the

penknife on his lx i, where it had probably fallen from the table.
Stavrogin decided not to tell anyone so that the young girl would be
punished.
Stavrogin explained his behavior in a rather lengthy passage
which deserves to be quoted in full:
Every unusually disgraceful, utterly degrading, dastardly,
and above all. ridiculous situation, in which I ever happened
to he in my life, always roused in me, side by side with
extreme anger, an incredible delight.
I felt exactly this
in moments of committing crimes and in moments when life was
in danger. If I stole, I would feel, while comitting the
theft, a rapture from the consciousness of the depth of my
vileness. It: was not the vileness that I loved (here my mind
was perfectly sane), but I enjoyed rapture from the tormenting
consciousness of the baseness.
In the same way each time when,
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standing at the barrier, I waited for my opponent to fire, I
experienced just the same disgraceful and wild sensation;
and once I did so with extraordinary vividness. I confess
that I often myself looked out for it, because it is to me
the strongest of sensations of the kind. When I received a
slap in the face . . . it was there too, in spite of my ter
rible anger. But if the anger is checked by it, then the
delight surpasses anything that can be imagined (Dostoevsky
1972, p. 44).
He went on to say that this delight in perversity never totally over
whelmed him; he was always in control of it.

He was always totally

conscious of what was happening to, and around, him.

In fact, this

consciousness, or avmreness, constituted the determining factor inso
far as the degree of pleasure extracted from these acts was concerned.
Stavrogin went on to say that he chose to be what he is.

His

crimes were not: the result of irresistible impulses; he was always
aware of what he was doing:

"And so let it be understand that I do

not claim irresponsibility for my crimes, either on account of either
environment or of disease” (Dostoevsky 1972, p. 45).
After an absence of three days, Stavrogin returned to the
lodgings where Matryosha resided and, although not all the specific
details are given, proceeded to violate her.

Her reaction to what

had just transpired was so intense tuat it is impossible to assume
that she had not been raped:
I think that all that happened must have seemed to her,
in the end, infinitely horrible, a deadly horror. . . . For
indeed it appeared to her in the end that she had committed
an immense crime, and was guilty of a mortal sin. "She had
1- H ie d iod" (DostOt
!i 0 ) .
In addition to the above, there are several references in the Note
books to The Possessed to the affect that Stavrogin has raoed a young
girl, one of which reads:

"The Prince (Stavrogin-G.T.) confesses his

villainy involving the. child (he raped her) to Shatov.

He has written
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a confession, wants to have it printed, shows it to Shatov, asking him
for advice" (Quoted in Guerard 1976, p. 290),

In addition, as Guerard

points out, it is clear from the Confession that Tikhon is convinced
that Stavrogin has violated the young girl (Guerard 1976, p. 280).
Since this crime has a profound affect on Stavrogin, it is
important to determine whether or not it actually occurred or was
merely a product of Stavrogin’s imagination.

The evidence given

above indicates that a rape actually took place.
Upon awakening the following morning Stavrogin experienced a
slight twinge of fear.

He was afraid that the girl had told her

mother what had transpired the previous day.

Upon arriving at her

house, he discovered that she had not told anyone about what had hap
pened.

That night, however, Stavrogin experienced an intense fear

which he was unable to account for.
murderous hatred of the girl.

Mixed in with this fear was a

Towards morning, this hatred was swept

away by another, and more intense, reaction of fear.
Several days later, Stavrogin decided to return to his lodg
ings in order to see Matryosha, who had been ill for several days and
was bed-ridden, alone.

She, shortly after Stavrogin arrived, jumped

out of her bed and shook her fist at him in a threatening manner.
her face there was an expression of total despair.

On

Stavrogin attempted

to console her but she backed off whenever he attempted to approach her,

c’t,v>.rogin rt:

»at uown.

tl<<— cafter,

Matryosha dashed into a "tiny box-room, which was like a hen-roost and
was next door to the water closet" (Dostoevsky 1972, p. 56).

When this

occurred, Stavrogin stated that a curious idea shot through his mind.
Although he did not say so, it is possible that this idea had to do
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with the realization that Matryosha was about to commit suicide.

His

lack of surprise upon discovering her corpse would tend to support this
hypothesis.

After having sat nationless for almost an hour, he got up,

peering through a crack in the door of the tiny room, saw that Matryosha
had hanged herself.
suicide.

Stavrogin assumed full responsibility for her

"I waa obviously in full possession of my mental faculties

and I hold myself responsible for everything" (Dostoevsky 1972, p. 45).
Later that day, while visiting friends, Stavrogin castigated
himself for his past behavior:

"I remember being conscious that I was

simply a low and despicable coward for my joy at having escaped and
that I should never be an honest man" (Dostoevsky 1972, p. 59).

Up to

this point in time, the 1922 translation of S. S. Kotelliansky and
Virginia Woolf which was reprinted in 1972 has been referred to.
However, a later translation by Avram Yarmolinsky contains an impor
tant passage which is not contained in the Koteli&nsky-Woolf transla
tion.

It comes immediately after the passage quoted above and reads

as follows:
And one more thing: I was reminded of the Jewish proverb:
"one's own may be bad, but it does not smell." For although
at heart I felt that I was a scoundrel, I was not ashamed of
it and, in general, was not much distressed. On that occa
sion, sitting at tea and chatting with the crew, for the
first time in my life I clearly formulated the following for
myself: I have neither the feeling nor the knowledge of good
and evil, but good and evil really do not exist (and this
pleased me) and are but a prejudice; I can be free of all
prejudices, but at the very moment wh(" T
dorrs I shall peri:
(Dostoevsky I960, p.
Stavrogin, shortly thereafter, stated that he was sick with
life and that he had, upon occasion, contemplated suicide.

His dis

gust with life had given rise to a great deal of hostility which he
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determined to vent on himself.

He set out to destroy himself.

Instead

of shooting himself, however, he decided to marry Marya Lebiadkin, a
cripple who was hovering on the edge of madness:

"The idea of the mar

riage of Stavrogin with that lowest of creatures excited my nerves.
Anything more monstrous it was impossible to imagine" (Dostoevsky 1972,
p. 60).

Shortly after the marriage, Stavrogin returned to the country

in order to visit his mother.

It was while he was visiting her that he

committed a series of acts which led many people to look upon him as
being mad.

In order to understand what happened next it is necessary

to leave the Confession temporarily and return to the novel proper.
The Confession resumes with Stavrogin’s departure from his home town.
The narrator of the novel, a citizen of the small provincial
town where Stavrogin’s mother resided and a friend of Stephan Verkhovensky, upon seeing Stavrogin for the first time, was struck by the
fact that his face was both beautiful and hideous simultaneously.

He

mentioned the fact that some of the citizens of the town had mentioned
that Stavrogin’s face reminded them of a mask.

The narrator then pro

ceeded to describe the "mad" acts which Stavrogin committed.
While visiting the local club, he suddenly walked over to a
certain Gagnov, an individual who frequently uttered the aphorism "No,
sir, they won't lead me by the no-.«•"
aim arouiia the room by his nose.

soevsL

... uj j aim .^gan to

The narrator mentioned the fact

that while this was going on Stavrogin looked abstracted, "as though
he were not in his right mind" (Dostoevsky 1965, p. 58).
Shortly thereafter, while attending a party, Stavrogin embraced
his host’s wife and kissed her passionately several times.
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When he was called in by the governor to explain his behavior
he responded by reaching over and biting the governor on the ear.
governor had him locked up in a special cell.

The

While .imprisoned,

Stavrogin was overcome by what the narrator referred to as an "acute
attack of brain fever'' (Dostoevsky 1965, p. 64).

The doctors who

attended him believed that Stavrogin had been delirious, or insane,
for some time.

Stavrogin, after two months in bed, seemed to have

fully recovered and left town.
ling.

He spent the next three, years travel

In order to find out what happened during this period of time,

it is necessary to return to the Confession.
One day, while staying at a hotel in a small town in Germany,
Stavrogin dreamt of a "Golden Age."

He dreamt of a race of happy,

innocent individuals who inhabited a corner of Greece.

The dream

filled Stavrogin with an overwhelming feeling of happiness.

Suddenly,

his feelings of happiness were interrupted when a dot of light In :
.
room was transformed into a tiny red spider which i‘~.

eiy reminded

him of a spider he had seen on the da” Matryosha killed herself.
vision, of Matryosha
appeal tu uwu r e him.

A

... uer hand raised in a threatening gesture,
Since that day, Stavrogin had called forth that

vision almost every day:
I saw Matryosha, grown haggard and with feverish eyes,
precisely as she had looked at the moment when she stood on
the threshold of my room, and shaking her head, had lifted
her tiny fist against me . . . what is intolerable to me is
only this image, namely, the little girl on the threshold
with her little fist lifted threatening me, only the way she
looked then, only that moment, neither before nor after,
only that shaking of the head. This threatening gesture, of
hers no longer seemed ridiculous to me, but terrifying. Pity
for her has stabbed me, a maddening pity, and I would have
given my body to be torn to pieces if that would have erased
what had happened. What I regret is not the crime, not her

death.
I'm not sorry for her, what I cannot bear is t:a. one
instant, I can't, I can'c, because I see her that wa every
day, and I know for a certainty that I am doomed.
It is
precisely that which I have not been able to b
since then,
and I couldn't bear it before either, but I didn't know it.
Since then I see the vision almost every day. It does not
appear to me of itself, yet I summon it of my own accord,
but I cannot help summoning it, although I cannot live with
it (Dostoevsky 1963, p. 717).
Even though he believed that the memory of Matryosha would eventually
drive him mad, he continued to recall it.

He believed that he could

dismiss it if he so chose but, as he put it, "I never wanted to do it
I myself do not want to, and never shall" (Dostoevsky 1972, p. 67).
Stavrogin continued to believe that he was in complete control cf the
world he inhabited.
Sometime later, while staying in Switzerland, Strovin felt a
desire to commit: a crime, i.e., bigamy.

However, a girl he met dis

suaded him.
The Confession ends with Stavrogin declaring that he intended
to distribute copies of his Confession far and wide.
to know what he had done.

He wanted peopl

He wanted everyone to look at him.

As the

narrator pointed out at the beginning of the chapter conceraing
Stavrogin*s visit to Tikhon and his confession:

"The fundamental

idea of the document is a terrible undisguised craving for selfpunishment, the need for the cross, for immolation in the eyes of
all" (Dostoevsky 1972, p. 39).
Dostoevsky points out the paradoxical nature of Stavrogin*s
behavior.

Up to this point in the novel, Stavrogin had stated, time

and time again, that he was in total control of himself at all times.
However, as the narrator pointed out:

"The author (Stavrogin-author
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of the Confession-G. Toews) declares that he could not help writing it,
that he was compelled . . ." (Dostoevsky 1972, p. 39).

Stavrogin was

a man who declared, almost simultaneously, that he was, and was not,
in control of his life.
Tikhon called into question Stavrogin*s avowed motives for
writing the Confession.
uinely contrite.

He did not believe that Stavrogin was gen

He believed that Stavrogin wanted to publish the

document solely in order to offend the public.
Tikhon stated that if Stavrogin was genuinely contrite he
should, instead of publishing his Confession, go into retreat for a
period of several years,

Stavrogin refused and dashed out of the

room.
The previous pages contain almost all of the information which
is needed in order to construct a coherent explanation of Stavrogin*s
behavior.

In order to complete this section, only a few additional,

incidents will be mentioned.
In one episode, Mrs. Stavrogin came across her son while he
appeared to be in a trance-like state:
Mrs. Stavrogin, who had been terribly worried during the
last few days . . . took the risk of going to see Nicholas
herself, though it was not the usual time, . . . She knocked
quietly as before and, again receiving no answer, opened the
door herself. Seeing that Nicholas was sitting unusually
motionless, she cautiously walked up to the sofa with a
beating heart. . . . His face was pale arid stern, but it
looked completely frozen and immobile; his brows were slightly
drawn together and frowning; he certainly looked like a life
less wax figure. She stood over him for about three minutes,
hardly daring to breathe, and suddenly she was seized with
panic; she tiptoed out of the room, stopped for a minute at
the doorway, hurriedly made the sign of the cross over him,
and went away unobserved, with a new 'heavy feeling and with
a new anguish (Dostoevsky 1965, p . 235).
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Mrs. Stavrogin's gesture conjures up the spectre of daemonic possession.
This would tie in with Stavrogin's confession to Tikhon that he was not
absolutely sure that his so-called hallucinations were not "really the
devil" (Dostoevsky 1972, p. 30).

The very title would confirm the cen

trality of the idea of possession.
addressed are:

Does the devil reside within the individual or is he,

or it, some kind of external force?
which haunt us?

The questions which have to be

Are we the creators of the demons

Are these hallucinations of evil nothing more than

manifestations of certain aspects of our personality which we would
rather not acknowledge?

These are the questions which Dostoevsky

poses.
Shortly after Mrs. Stavrogin had left the room, Stavrogin
roused himself and set out to visit Kirilov and Shatov, two individ
uals who, for a long time, had looked upon Stavrogin as their teacher
and friend.

Stavrogin has, simultaneously, preached a Slavophil

nationalist Christianity to Shatov and atheistic materialism to
Kirilov.

This is brought out in a statement Shatov makes to

Stavrogin:
In America I lay three months on straw beside a wretched
fellow, and I learnt from him that at the very time you were
planting the idea of God and country in my heart, that at
that very time, perhaps during those very days, you had been
envenoming the heart of that poor fellow, of that maniac
Kirilov. You filled him with lies and slanders and brought
him to the verge, of insanity. God look at him now-he's your
creation (Dostoevsky 1965, p. 253).
The conversations that

took place during these two meetings revealed

that Stavrogin no longer believed in the ideas he preached to these
two individuals, assuming he. ever did.

As he told Shatov:

"I assure

you that this repetition of my old ideas makes en extremely unpleasant
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impression on me.

Won't you stop” (Dostoevsky 1965, p. 255).

Sbatov

asked Stavrogin if it is true that he debauched children while he was
living in Petersburg.

Stavrogin responded in the following manner:

. . but I didn't molest children,' said Stavrogin, but only after
a pause that lasted much too long.

He went pale in the face and his

eyes flashed” (Dostoevsky 1965, p. 260).

Dostoevsky seems to be imply

ing that there is at le-^c a grain of truth contained in Shatov's
accusation.
Shatov also accused Stavrogin of being unable to make the dis
tinction between good and evil.

He attributes this failing on

Stavrogin*s part to "morbid hysteria":
I don’t know why evil is bad and good is beautiful either
. . . but T do know why the feeling for the distinction
between them becomes blurred and is lost in such gentlemen
as the Stavrogins. Do you know why you got married to that
woman in so infamous and despicable a fashion? Just because
the infamy and absurdity of such a marriage reached the pitch
of genius! Oh, you never walk at the edge of the abyss; but
precipitate yourself over it boldly, head downwards. You got
married because of your passion for cruelty, because of your
passion for remorse, because of your moral turpitude. It was
a case of morbid hysteria. The challenge to common sense was
too tempting to be resisted! (Dostoevsky 1965, pp. 260-261).
Not only is Stavrogin renounced by Shatov, he is, in addition,
renounced by two women who have played an important part in his life,
i.e., his demented wife and Lisa.

His wife, Mary, who had at one time

looked upon him as a beautiful prince, now refers to him as a pre
tender.

Sometime later, Lisa, a woman whom Stavrogin had met during

the course of his travels and whose mother is a friend of Stavrogin's
mother, refused to have anything more to do with him.
Let me return such noble frankness by being frank myself.
I don't want: to be a compassionate hospital nurse for you.
Perhaps I will really end up as a hospital nurse if I don't
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find a way of dying conveniently this very day; but even if I
do become a nurse, I won’t be your nurse; though, of course,
you need one more than any legless or armless man. I always
imagined that you would take me to some place where there was
a huge, wicked spider as big as a man, and we should spend
the rest of our lives, looking at it and being afraid of it.
That's what our love would be wasted on (Dostoevsky 1965,
p. 522).
Lisa had no desire to spend the rest of her life looking after a moral
cripple.
At the end of the novel, Stavrogin committed suicide.

Shortly

before he had decided to end his life, he had written a letter to Dasha,
Shatov’s sister.

Dasha x^as one of the few people whom Stavrogin

respected and to whom he seemed bound to tell the truth.

In this let

ter he stated that he felt responsible for the death of his wife, who
was killed by a convict, and Lisa, who was killed during the course of
a riot.

He felt that he had failed them when they needed him and, in

s o doing, contributed, directly or indirectly, to their deaths.

He

went on to acknowledge his spiritual impotence— his inability to direct
his strength into positive and rewarding channels.
as they were, were too weak to motivate him.

His desires, such

He stated:

I know that I ought to kill myself, to brush myself off
the earth, like some loathsome insect; but 1 am afraid of
showing magnanimity.
I know that it will be another delusion again, a delu
sion in an infinite sequence of delusions. What is the use
of deluding oneself merely in order to play at magnanimity?
Indignation and shame I can never feel, therefore not
despair, either (Dostoevsky 1965, p. 667).
Stavrogin committed suicide because he had transcended all human emo
tions, up to and including despair.

He killed himself because he had

ceased to be human.
On the table next tc where he was dangling, Stavrogin had left
a scrap of paper with the words "No one is to blame, I did it myself"

87

(Dostoevsky 1965, p. 669).

The doctors, after the post-mortem, came

to the conclusion that the suicide was definitely not the act of an
insane man.

Analysis of Stavrogin
Gibson, in his study of Dostoevsky's religious thought, defines
the "problem" which is Stavrogin

in the following manner:

"Because he

spurns limitation and cannot escape it, he must suffer and, what is
more, he can achieve i othing— achievement depends on the contraction
of will to a definite object" (Gibson 1973, p. 129).
This "spurning of limitation" can be traced back to Stavrogin*s
relationship with Stephan:
The tutor communicated all the moral uncertainty and
instability of his own character to his unfortunate pupil,
without providing anything positive to counteract their
unsettling effects; the result was to leave an aching
emptiness at the heart of Stavrogin*s being (Frank 1969,
p. 668).
This "aching emptiness" gave rise to an "eternal, sacred longing"
(Dostoevsky 1965, p. 55)— a longing for an absolute.

Stavrogin, how

ever, did not look outside of himself for an absolute to which he could
cling.

Stephan, the individual who, through his behavior, gave rise to

Stavrogin*s longing for an absolute, at one and the same time, filled
Stavrogin with a sense of uncertainty concerning the external world.
The relationship between teacher and pupil gave rise to a distorted
perception of the world, insofar as Stavrogin was concerned.

The

world was transformed into a threatening place where anything could
happen at anytime.

The result of this was that Stavrogin ended up

recoiling from the external world and attempted to find a comforting
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absolute to which he could commit himself within the confines of the
self:

"His quest is a spiritual experimentation totally preoccupied

with itself, totally enclosed within the ego, and hence incapable
of that self-surrender that it is presumably seeking" (Frank 1969,
p. 669).

Holquist makes the same point when he states:

. . through

out the novel he is characterized by the most intense striving, the
quest that has as its goal an absolute ego" (Holquist 1977, p. 139).
Stavrogin attempted to elevate his will to the level of an
absolute.

This would account for such apparently irrational acts as:

(1) leading a fellow club member around by the nose, (2) kissing
another man’s wife in the presence of that very same man, and (3)
biting the ear of the governor of the province.

Stavrogin committed

these acts in order to prove that his was indeed an untrammeled will,
a will which admitted to no restrictions:

"Stavrogin seeks to astound,

to perform a deed that will be so unexpected that it can have sprung
only from a self free of all constraints imposed by social restric
tions" (Holquist 1977, p. 1+2).

What Stavrogin failed to fully com

prehend was that in attempting to be "everything," i.e., omnipotent,
he was denying the fact of human limitations.
ferer" (Gibson 1973, p. 129).

Hence, he "is a suf

This would help to explain why Stavrogin

experienced an attack of brain fever shortly after the ear-biting inci
dent.

As Gibson points out, the term "brain fever" is "Dostoevsky’s

usual way of describing nervous prostration" (Gibson 1973, p. 129).
Finite man cannot transform himself into an omnipotent creature who
is totally free from all moral constraints.

Any, and all, attempts

to achieve this kind of impossible transformation are bound to give
rise to tragedy:

. . h e (Stavrogin) transcends humanity only in
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idea.

In actual life, for one man to be exhaustively universal is

impossible, and the result must be tragedy" (Gibson 1973, p. 129).
Stavrogin refused to accept the fact that the will, as pointed out
by Peterson and Schrag, is finite and limited.
There is only one area, as Gibson points out, in which there
is no limited to the "all-man"— the man who refuses to accept the
fact of limitation.

That area is the imagination.

"It is possible

for the totally uncommitted man with all his strength and for him only,
to develop out of himself different and incompatible possibilities and
to try them out on other people" (Gibson 1973, p. 132).

Stavrogin

"experiment#' with Kirilov, Shatov, and Peter Verkhovensky.
Verkhovensky he implants the idea of revolution.
^
....... ’
>■’
to the cause of Man-God.
ings.

Into

He wins Shatov over

Stavrogin does not act upon his own imagin

He never commits himself to any idea.

What he does do is to

take the ideas which he has played with and implant them in the minds
of others.

Having converted these others, he proceeds to refute them.

He never acknowledges, or accepts, the fact that his "experiments" have
wreaked havoc on the lives of others.
It is important to note the similarities, as well as the differ
ences, which existed between Stephan, the teacher, and Stavrogin, the
teacher.

Stephan, who was himself very childlike, was unable to recog

nize that his young charge, Stavrogin, was an extremely vulnerable and
impressionable child.

He seemed to look upon Stavrogin as being little

more than a receptacle, a "thing" into which he could pour all of his
doubts and misgivings.

Instead of a healthy student-teacher relation

ship in which the rights of both individuals are respected, the reader,
in the case of Stephan and Stavrogin, was confronted with a one-sided

90

relationship in which one individual, albeit inadvertently, ended up
almost destroying another simply because he did not treat this other
with the respect due another human being.
Stavrogin regarded his pupils (Shatov, Kirilov and Peter) as
things.

In this he resembled Stephan.

He converted his pupils to

certain ideas and then proceeded to disillusion them.

Re tried out

ideas on them in the same way scientists try out experimental drugs
on mice:
He (Stavrogin) is impelled by a demonic force to exert his
influence on others, to implant in them ideas, to start
movements. And he is driven on by an irrepressible urge to
dominate and manipulate the lives of others, to torture and
destroy. However, this strong urge itself deteriorates
eventually into mere coldly calculating and experimenting
curiosity (Reinhardt 1969, p. 68).
Stavrogin’s "coldly calculating and experimenting curiosity" stood in
sharp contrast to Stephan’s devouring emotionalism.
extent, a reaction to Stephan’s emotionalism.

It was, to a large

As a child, Stavrogin

was confronted with a world which was anything but comforting.

As

Guntrip, in his discussion of severe schizoid states, points out:
"The world is a frightening emptiness when it does not respond and
meet the infant's needs, and a frightening persecutor when it actively
and hurtfully impinges" (Guntrip 1976, p. 68).

To the young Stavrogin,

the world was a horrible place in which happiness is conspicuous by its
absence.

Given this view of the world, it is almost inevitable that the

individual would attempt to escape, i.e., to return "to a vaguely remem
bered earlier safe place, even though In fact he can only withdraw into
isolation within himself" (Guntrip 1976, p. 68).

Stavrogin's dream of

a Golden Age, a dream inhabited by a race of happy, innocent individuals
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who reside in a corner of Greece, represented his a 1 1empt to recapture
the innocence that he felt he once knew.

When he attempted to recap

ture the happiness aroused in him by this dream, however, he was dis
turbed by the vision of a spider.

This vision indicates "that he has

irrevocably destroyed the possibility of innocence than mankind, and
he as a child, once knew" (Friedman 1970, pp. 178-179).
safe place to which Stavrogin could withdraw.

There is no

His dream was simply

that, a dream.
Stavrogin's reaction to Stephan is very close to what Laing,
in his existential study of madness, refers to as the fear of engulfment:
In this (engulfment) the individual dreads relatedness as
such, with anyone or anything or, indeed, even with him
self, because his uncertainty about the stability of his
autonomy lays him open to the dread lest in any relation
ship he will lose his autonomy and identity (Laing 1967,
p. 44).
An individual suffering from this particular afflication equates love
and affection with destruction of self.

For him to allow himself to

be loved by another would be tantamount to committing suicide.

In

order to "save" himself, this particular type of individual resorts
to the maneuver of isolation.
engulfed by the other.

Either one is alone or else one is

These are the only two choices this partic

ular type of individual can perceive:

"...

instead of the polarities

of separateness and relatedness based on individual autonomy, there is
the antithesis between complete loss of being by absorption into tne
other person (engulfment) and complete isolation" (Laing 1967, p. 44).
There is no third way.

Such an individual is unable to acknowledge

that it is possible for two individuals to establish a relationship
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which would be anything other than destructive of self.
There is no . . . possibility of a dialectical relationship
between two persons, both sure of their own ground and, on
this very basis, able to "lose" themselves in each other.
Such merging of being can only occur in an "authentic" way
only when the individuals are sure of themselves (Laing
1967, p. 44).
Stavrogin, however, is anything but sure of himself.

He lacks what Laing

refers to as "a firm sense of one’s own autonomous identity" (Laing 1967,
p. 44).

Stavrogin is an example of an ontologically insecure person,

i.e., one who looks upon himself as being more unreal than real, more
dead than alive.

As pointed out in the Definition of Terms section,

Stavrogin’s mother never provided him with the emotional sustenance
required by a young child.

The situation was exacerbated when he was

placed in the care of Stephan, a man who exposed the young child to a
continuous outpouring of his "wounded feelings" (Dostoevsky 1965, p. 53).
Stavrogin ended up by withdrawing and, in so doing, denied not
merely the other, but himself as well for, as Danto points out, "the
concept of myself, having being as a person for myself, entails an
understanding of my existing for others" (Danto 1975, p. 115).
Stavrogin, like the individual described by Laing, equated
affection with destruction of self.

Such an attitude is understand

able since the individual he was devoted to as a child, Stephan, almost
destroyed him with "affection.”

From Stavrogin’s point of view, hostil

ity is an emotion which was, by definition, infinitely preferable to
love.

Stavrogin's world was one which was turned upside down, a world

in which hate was good and love was destructive.
The withdrawal from life that characterized Stavrogin gave rise
to a state of acute boredom:

"It (boredom) is a state signifying
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withdrawal from life.
1968, p. 21).

. . . The bored man sees no reason to move" (Harper

Only occasionally did Stavrogin arouse himself from his

state of inertia.

When he did arouse himself, however, he did so solely

in order to strike out at a world he feared and despised:
inertia is not to be thought of as permanent.

. . his

He can pull himself

together, at least to the extent of taking a malicious swipe at the
world" (Harper 1969, p. 21).

Guntrip, in commenting on manic behav

ior, provides the reader with an insight into the rationale underlying
Stavrogin’s sudden behavioral changes (from boredom to hostility).
It (manic activity, i.e., over-activity) is a desperate
attempt to force the whole psyche out of a state of
devitalized passivity, surrender of the will to live,
and regression. The harder the struggle to defeat the
passive regressed ego, the more incapable of rest and
relaxation the patient becomes (Guntrip 1976, p. 154).
Stavrogin behaves in an aggressive and destructive manner in a desper
ate attempt to preserve his fragile ego from the encroachments of a
world which he looks upon as being extremely hostile.

He fears that

if he gives himself over entirely to a state of inertia his already
weakened ego will be totally engulfed by the ex^rnal world.
Stavrogin engaged in extreme acts such c3 the violation of the
young girl in a desperate attempt to wrest himself from the ennui which
he felt was slowly but surely destroying him.

This alternating between

extreme apathy and feverish activity, as May pointed out, is the mani
festation of a disordered will.

These bursts of feverish activity,

which are manifestations of what Harper refers to as "motiveless
freedom" (Harper 1968), p. 22) were, in the case of Stavrogin, destruc
tive in nature.

He violated a young girl and drove her to suicide.

He humiliated the governor and several other individuals and, in
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marrying Mary, he hastened her destruction:
When boredom takes the form of numbness, when the bored man
becomes unfeeling, cold, indifferent to the welfare of others,
he is potentially dangerous to society. He is dangerous to
himself as well, for his sense of motive and his self-control
may degenerate rapidly . . . until he becomes depressed or
demoralized (Harper 1968, p. 22).
Toward the end of the novel, Stavrogin had become so demoralised that
he felt the only option to him was suicide.
It is important to bear in mind at all times one important
point.

In regard to Stavrogin, the past, in the form of the relation

ship which had existed between himself and Stephan, had exercised an
inordinate amount of control over his behavior.

However, this does

not mean that Stavrogin's behavior was determined solely by what had
occurred in the past.

It would be erroneous to assume that the adult

Stavrogin behaved as he did solely because of the events which had
occurred in his childhood.

"A" does not invariably give rise to "B."

There is always the element of choice.

The past dominated Stavrogin

to the extent that it did because he, to a large extent, allowed it
to.

His behavior was something over which he was capable of exer

cising at least a

animal amount of control.

However, in choosing

not to let the barriers which he had erected between himself and
others down, he ended up by destroying himself.

Summary
The relationship which existed between Stavrogin and his tutor
gave rise to a longing, on Stavrogin’s part, for an absolute, which
would endow his existence with meaning.

Unwilling to look outside of

himself in a world which he regarded as hostile, he withdrew and
attempted to locate the absolute within himself.

He elevated his
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will to the level of an absolute.

In so doing, he failed to realize

that the will could not stand up under the burden he had placed upon it.

A healthy will is one which is aware of its limitations.

A healthy will

is one which plays an active part "in the stream of temporalized and
spatialized experience" (Schrag 1969, p. 100).

Stavrogin’s will was

disordered because he refused to accept its limitations or acknowledge
the fact that in cutting it off from the external world, the world of
others, he was destroying it.

Stavrogin's inability to elevate the

will to the level of an absolute gave rise to a perpetual oscillation
between states of extreme apathy and extreme activity.

In the end,

he committed suicide because he had become completely demoralised.

CHAPTER V

IMPLICATIONS FOR LEARNING

The latter section of Chapter IV consisted of an analysis of
Stavrogin*s life.

This concluding section suggests ways in which the

relationship between the will and the learning process, which was
badly distorted in the case of Stavrogin, can be strengthened.

In

so doing, reference will be made to Dostoevsky’s epistemology and
the relationship which exists between it and the learning process.
The last part of this section consists of a brief summary and con
clusion to the entire study.
Dostoevsky was firmly convinced that

"Man is authentically

a self onlv by virtue of his moral life" (Reinhardt 1969, p. 42).
Man is a creature characterized by freedom.

As such, he is con

tinually confronted with the dilemma of choosing between good and
evil.

In choosing evil, such as Stavrogin does, the individual for

sakes his freedom and gives hitnself ever to his passions.
a slave.

He becomes

Those who choose evil are invariably isolated individuals

because one of the essential ways in which one becomes aware of, and
chooses, the path of good is through interaction with others.

Posi

tive interaction with others gives rise to an awareness of the exis
tence of God.

Stavrogin chose evil, at least in part, because his

early interaction with Stephan, which was totally negative, turned
him away from others and back onto himself.
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Stavrogin became a
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totally isolated individual who attempted to uncover some absolute
within the confines of self.

His quest was doomed to failure.

In

portraying the relationship which existed between Stephan and
Stavrogln, Dostoevsky demonstrated the traumatic affect which a
student-teacher relationship can have on an individual.

Whether or

not such a relationship is constructive is dependent upon the way
in which the two individuals involved view each other.

In the case

of Stephan-Stavrogin, the teacher viewed the student as an object
and, in so doing, helped to bring about his eventual destruction.
The Stephan-Stavrogin relationship is an excellent example of what
the teacher-student relationship should not be.

In examining such

a relationship it is possible to determine what constitutes a con
structive relationship.

In the following pages the outlines of a

positive teacher-student relationship are delineated.

Such a rela

tionship is diametrically opposed to the one described by Dostoevsky
in The Possessed.

The learning Process and Dostoevsky's Epistemology
. . . (the educator) does not merely consider individual
functions of his pupil, as one intending to teach him only
to know or to be capable of certain things; but his con
cern is always with the pupil as a whole, both in the
actuality in. which he lives before you now and in his
possibilities which he can become (Buber 1961, p. 132).
Dostoevsky's epistemology aligns him with those individuals
referred to as Christian existentialists.
is concerned wx;

This particular section

i way in which this particular philosophical

stance views the learning process.
From a Christian existential point of view, the. individual
is more than merely a mind.

. . . any education dealing with the child as with a pure mind
or a disembodied intellect, despising or ignoring sense and
sensation, punishing imagination as a mere power of deception,
, , . is a distortion of the Christian idea of education
(Maritain 1957. p, 174).
The individual is a free, responsible, aspiring and striving subject
ivity who is in a perpetual state of becoming.

As Buber pointed out,

the educator must be constantly concerned with what an individual can
become, i.e., must be aware of the limitless possibilities of self.
This approach is diametrically opposed to one in which the individual
is regarded as an essentially static "thing" into whose head the
teacher pours knowledge.
The existentialist is acutely aware of the fact that man exists
in relationship.

This is why, from an educational point of view,

nothing is more important than the relationship which exists between
the teacher and his students.

This is a . 'tint which is strongly empha

sized by individuals like Buber:
He (Buber) holds that the educational relationship is a
peculiar kind of personal relationship in which the
teacher and pupil stand in personal communion and dia
logue. This unique relationship between the educator
and the pupil makes up the basis of the phenomenon of
education (Mundackal 1977, p. 213).
Teacher and pupil are engaged in a dialogue, the airr of which
is self-realization for both.

Given the demands placed upon him. it

is essential that the teacher be an individual who, while nurturing
"with love and pain" (Hill 1973, p. 281) the emerging self within
each individual student, sees to it that he does not encroach upon
the student to the point at which he would be overwhelmed.

The

teacher must be characterized by a balance between the affective
and the cognitive if he is to function effectively.

The student

99

will suffer if he is exposed to a teacher who is characterized by an
imbalance in one direction or another,

Stephan, for example, was a

teacher who succumbed to an excess of subjectivity.
Stavrog:n beneath the weight of his problems.

He almost buried

Diametrically opposed

to a teacher such as Stephan, is one who errors on the side of objec
tivity :
. . . there are many teachers who have responded to modern
pressures for a scientific-academic curriculum by setting
their sights on good results in examinations and assuming
neutrality towards moral and social side effects.
Such
excess of objectivity also produces crippled persons
(Hill 1973, p. 281).
The Christian existentialists place such a great deal of empha
sis on the relationship which exists between student and teacher because,
from their point of view, the relationship to another human being is a
metaphor for the relationship of the individual to God.

Ir engaging in

a relationship characterized by mutual self realization, the individual
is drawn on to even "higher levels of mutual self realization and union
with the absolute Thou (God)" (Mundackal 1977, p. 212).
The Christian existentialist favors the Socratic approach to
teaching, an approach characterized by intimate and personal relation
ship in which both parties accept the other-as-subject and respond to
him, or her, accordingly.
mutual interaction.

Knowledge and wisdom are to be gained through

The educator, from this perspective, must never

engage in indoctrination.

The

Christian existentialists realize that

one cannot be forced to choose the path of good.

This is a choice

which must be freely made.
One of the primary functions of education is to make the indi
vidual aware of the fact that he. is a unique, choosing subjectivity
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who must assume responsibility for his actions.

Christian existential

ists also stress the fact that man must be made aware of the anguish
and suffering which are an integral aspect of human life.

The student

cannot be expected to choose wisely if he is exposed to an artificial
and unrealistic view of life, i.e., a view which glosses over anything
which might be considered unpleasant.
Life is to be understood only through living it.
emphasis is placed on the experiences of the individual.

Therefore,
"In Marcel's

terms, the dilemma of being is not to be solved in the manner of an
ordinary scientific problem, but as a mystery to be understood only
through living— a mystery never fully disclosed" (Kneller 1958, p. 67).
From an existential point of view, the primary concern of the
school should be moral education, i.e., with developing "not only the
capacity for but also the inclination toward moral choice" (O'Neill
1969, p. 71).

In other words, the educational system should concern

itself with the development of individuals who are capable of respond
ing to moral questions as they emerge in an enlightened and responsible
manner.

The emphasis should be placed on making choices and assuming

responsibility for them.
In order to achieve this particular goal, it is essential that
educational institutions not resort to authoritarian controls Insofar
as their students are concerned:
Moral content cannot be separated from the moral proce
dures that are used to establish and maintain classroom
discipline. The development of free choice is incompatible
with arbitrary or externalized control. Autonomy is not
derived through a system characterized by habituation to
unquestioning obedience (O'Neill 1969, p. 75).
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A didactic approach is inappropriate when addressing oneself to the
question of moral choice:

"The danger with vicarious morality is

. . . that while waiting for Moses to lead them into the promised
land, the children may forget hew to walk" (O'Neill 1969, p. 76).
All existentialists, Christian or otherwise, hold to the belief
that moral principles can only be acquired through direct personal
experience:

"...

the foundation of morality lies within the indi

vidual himself; it is to our own inner experience that we must turn
if we wish to validate our beliefs and actions" (Kneller 1958, p. 78).
The teacher cannot dictate morality to his students.

He cannot expect

the student to unquestionably accept those values which he, the
teacher, has determined are most important for him.
Only those values which the individual has freely adopted will
be meaningful to him.

For this reason, a great deal of emphasis is

placed on personal autonomy:
For the existentialists, autonomy is not a fact to be
learned but a process to be mastered. A system of moral
education based upon the unreflective assimilation of the
conclusions of others unfortunately provides no basis for
deriving one's own conclusions (O'Neill 1969, p. 77).
The student must realize that he, and he alone, must make those choices
which will determine what he is.

To simply slavishly emulate the

beliefs of others is tantamount to denying one's self.

The teacher's

primary function is to question the student’s beliefs by making him
aware of alternatives, of options.

In so doing, he forces the student

to examine his beliefs and the way in which he arrived at them.

The

teacher must see to it that the student never becomes complacent.

He

is there to raise questions which will force his students to think.
It is important to question even if there are no answers, definitive

10?.
or otherwise, to the questions asked:
The understanding of teaching as the asking of questions
to which no one knows the answer will no doubt seem outrageouslv bizarre. It certainly runs counter to all conventional
conceptions of teaching and learr.irg. Moreover, it places
the teacher under heavy obligations of imagination and
insight. . , . But difficulty must he measured against
yield, namely, the possible awakening of the student to
his awareness of choice, freedom, and responsibility in
his own selfhood (Mortis 1966, p. 137).
To question is to confront.

To confront is to force the individual to

delve into himself in quest of answers.

In the process, he becomes

aware of himself as a choosing subjectivity who is, above all else,
free.
From an existential point of view, education is synonomous
with life:
Education is more than the possession of knowledge.
Knowledge without understanding is lifeless. Education
is the constant pursuit to understand what is coherent
and vital in and to life. It is true that many educa
tional philosophers have considered education to be life
itself, that education is experiencing the wholeness of
life (Peterson 1970, p. 43).
Man, as has been pointed out, is a creature of feeling as well as intel
lect, and in order to truly know something he must be able to perceive
the relation which exists between it and himself.

TJhat is of crucial

importance is not the mere accumulation of knowledge but rather what
the individual does with that knowledge.

The function of knowledge, is

to free man, i.e., to help him tn understand himself and the world
around him.

From this point of view, subject matter is more than

merely an end itself, or a tool which the individual manipulates in
order to prepare himself for a career.
standing and improvement of self.

It is a means for the under

In order for this goal to be real

ized education must make the individual aware of the infinite
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possibilities of his freedom as well as the fact that he must assume
responsibility for what he chooses to become.
Existentialists place a great deal of emphasis on the study of
the humanities because it is through a study of the humanities that
man comes to terms with human anguish, anxiety, death and the problem
of freedom.

However, this does not mean that other areas of knowledge

are neglected.

All areas of study are, by definition, interrelated.

For example, in order to fully appreciate a subject such as literature,
it is necessary to be aware of what is happening in fields such as
philosophy, sociology, psychology, and physics.

Although physics and

literature, at first glance, would seem to have little in common, the
fact remains that recent advances in physics have profoundly altered
man's way of perceiving reality and, in so doing, have forced writers
to look at, and interpret, the world in a way which differs from the
ty in which earlier generations interpreted it.

For example, as

Bryant points out in his discussion of the theory of relativity:

"it

suggests an unprecedented freedom and openntc ~ in both physical real
ity and, by analogy, human reality" (Bryant 1970, p. 30).

In trans

forming areas of study into discrete areas of specialization which
purport to be totally self-sufficient, man ends up by distorting the
nature of the world he inhabits.

The individual must be made aware

of the opportunities open to him and, in conjunction with this, the
fact that: he is free to choose from among those possibilities.

This

goal can be achieved only if the artificial barriers which exist
between the various fields of knowledge are demolished.
A teacher, from an existential point of view, is one who is:
. . authenticating his existence at every moment of his life, who
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has developed a consistent scale of values and is committed to it.
Without imposing himself he must make his children think about the
problems of life" (Seetharamu 1978, p. 87).

The student and the

teacher should interact in an atmosphere of freedom and love.

I .eally,

the student-teacher relationship is one which is characterized by open
ness and reciprocity.

The primary responsibility of a teacher in this

kind of relationship is to help the student achieve the goal of selfrealization.

Vaclav Cerny, in commenting on his discussion of

Dostoevsky’s The Possessed, presents us with a portrait of the ideal
teacher:
. . . those teachers who were helpful, really helpful, were
only the dangerous and discomfiting ones who taught me to
see the questions rather than to adopt the answers and who
put tools into my hand with which to come to grips with the
difficulties myself. They awakened a thirst in me, but they
refused to quench it (Cerny 1975, p. 68).
Such a teacher considers his primary goal to consist of making the
student aware of his freedom:

”. . .

they taught me my freedom,

which they did not intend to snare in their own" (Cerny 1975, p. 70).

Summary and Conclusions
During the course of this study, the author attempted to clarify
the nature of the relationship which existed between the learning process
and the will.

In order to accomplish this goal, emphasis was placed on.

the study of the moral development of a character in a novel by
Dostoevsky, i.e., Stavrogin in The Possessed.

The learning process,

in the context of this study, referred to the interaction which takes
place when two individuals freely enter into a relationship in order
to examine those ideas which have a bearing on their existence.

The

will referred to that aspect of the personality which was responsible
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for committing the individual to that relationship between two individ
uals which is at the heart of the learning process.

Learning will not

take place unless one acknowledges the existence of the other-assubject.

Education implies relationship:

"This unique relationship

between the educator and the pupil makes up the basis of the phenomenon
of education'

(Mundacltal 1977, p. 213).

This "unique relationship"

entailed both the student and the teacher realizing, or actualizing,
themselves through that act of faith which entails acceptance of the
subjectivity of the other, an acceptance which cannot be empirically
validated.
Stavrogin, in isolating himself from the other, distorted the
true nature of both the learning process and the will.

In attempting

to transform the will into an absolute, he failed to realize that the
will, in order to runction effectively, must, in addition to maintain
ing a balance between the affective and the cognitive, recognize and
accept its limitations.

In addition, it must realize that healthy

functioning entails interacting with the world which one inhabits.
Stavrogin negated the learning process by refusing to respond to
anything outside of himself.

In isolating himself from the rest of

the world Stavrogin ended by destroying himself.
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